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The purpose of this research project was to examine one
company's disagreements with Government contract reviewers
over the application of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).
Three specific cases of non-compliance, involving CAS 401,
402, 405 and 418, were examined in detail. These cases were
selected because of the relative significance of the dollar
amounts involved, the extreme variances in interpreting the
standards and methods of implementing the standards, and the
inordinate length of time it took to resolve the issues.
After careful analysis of the three cases, specific
conclusions and recommendations are presented. Areas covered
include: the Administrative Contracting Officer's (ACO)
knowledge of CAS, the ability of smaller companies to adhere
to CAS requirements, the Government's policy on cost impact
and recovery, the rules regarding the implementation of a new
standard, the difficulty in determining the exact cost impact
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) was originally
established by Congress in order to develop Cost Accounting
Standards that would achieve uniformity and consistency in the
cost accounting principles followed by defense contractors and
subcontractors under Federal contracts. Once a company falls
under the purview of the Standards, it is up to the company to
ensure that all of its cost accounting practices meet the
requirements imposed by the Standards. For some companies,
this can mean a complete restructuring of its cost accounting
system, a costly and time consuming process. This, coupled
with the fact that the Standards themselves are open to a wide
degree of interpretation, have led to many disputes involving
the Cost Accounting Standards over the years.
This research project will examine one such company which
has had numerous disagreements with Government contract
reviewers over the application of Cost Accounting Standards.
The company, which for the sake of anonymity will be called
American Electronics Corporation (AEC), has been cited for
non-compliance with six different Cost Accounting Standards
over the past ten years. Three of these cases of non-
compliance (involving four different standards) have been
significant in nature and will be the focus of this study.
These cases were selected because of the relative significance
of the dollar amounts involved, the extreme variances in
interpreting the standards and methods of implementing the
standards, and the inordinate length of time it took to
resolve the issues. In each instance, the company disputes
the allegations of non-compliance based on varying
interpretations and methods of implementation of the
Standards. As a result, the issues have taken years to
resolve. This study will evaluate the costing process from
both the Government and Industry standpoints in order to
develop findings and recommendations from these events for use
by others in applying the Cost Accounting Standards.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The basic research question for this study is: How did
the defense contractor, American Electronics Corporation, and
the Government interpret and implement the Cost Accounting
Standards, how were the issues resolved, and what conclusions
can be drawn by Government and Industry from these events?
The following subsidiary questions were formulated to further
define the basic research question:
1. With which Cost Accounting Standards has American
Electronics Corporation been in non-compliance, and what are
the requirements that these Standards have imposed on
Government contractors ?
2. How have these Standards been interpreted by both
Government and Industry since their inception ?
3. What are the circumstances surrounding the non-compliance
of the Cost Accounting Standards at American Electronics
Corporation ?
4. How has American Electronics Corporation attempted to
mitigate the non-compliance issues ?
5. What has been the outcome of both the Government's and
the company's actions to resolve the issues ?
6. What conclusions can be drawn from these cases by both
Government and Industry in dealing with the Cost Accounting
Standards ?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis will be a case study of American Electronics
Corporation's non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards
401, 402, 405 and 418. Each of these four Standards will be
thoroughly examined in terms of their specific requirements
and their application in the case of American Electronics
Corporation. Some of the issues involved in this case study
go back as far as 1982, and as a result some of the
individuals involved, both from the Government and the
company, are no longer available to discuss the specific
circumstances surrounding the issues. However, the researcher
feels that this limitation is not significant because: (1)
documentation from both the Government and the company was
thorough and very explicit, and (2) the individuals currently
involved with Cost Accounting Standards issues for the
Government and the company were familiar with all the issues
to be examined in this study and openly discussed the
positions that were taken at the time.
Throughout this study it is assumed that the reader is
reasonably familiar with basic cost accounting and DOD
contracting concepts, procedures and terminology.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information necessary to complete this study was
gathered by conducting personal interviews and reviewing
available literature, audit reports, memorandums and letters.
Interviews were conducted with the current Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) and the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) auditor who is currently assigned to conduct
audits of the company. During an on-site visit to American
Electronics, interviews were conducted with the company's
Government Contracts Administrator and the Supervisor, Pricing
and Cost Analysis. The interviews were used along with DCAA
audit reports, in-house Government memoranda, and letters from
both the ACO and the company to reconstruct the specific
circumstances involved in the various Cost Accounting Standard
non-compliance issues of American Electronics Corporation.
Information on the applicable Cost Accounting Standards was
obtained from a thorough review of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Part 30, as well as any available literature
dealing with the Cost Accounting Standards Board or the Cost
Accounting Standards.
In soliciting their cooperation for this project,
individuals representing both the Government and the company
have been given complete anonymity. Also, the company has
been disguised (name, industry, location) in order to preserve
its confidentiality. As a result of this, the letters,
memoranda and audit reports that were obtained from these
sources and used in this research can not be referenced.
Excerpts from these documents will be used to provide the
reader with a better understanding of the issues, and will be
identified as such in the text.
The literature utilized in this study was compiled from
multiple sources, including the Defense Logistics Information
Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC), the Federal Legal Information Through Electronics
(FLITE), previous theses, and a review of current publications
and periodicals relevant to the fields of Federal procurement
and accounting.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II will present a brief history of how and why the
Cost Accounting Standards Board was established, and a
discussion of the authority granted to the Board. Also, the
requirements of each of the Cost Accounting Standards to be
analyzed in the three cases will be discussed in detail as
well as any significant interpretations made by Government or
Industry of those Standards since their inception.
Chapters III, IV and V each cover a Cost Accounting
Standard non-compliance case involving American Electronics
Corporation. Each chapter contains a complete discussion of
the facts involved, resolution of the issues and analysis of
the actions taken and decisions made by each party. Chapter
III will contain background information on American
Electronics Corporation and will cover CAS 401 and CAS 402.
Chapter IV will cover CAS 405, and Chapter V will cover CAS
418.
Chapter VI will present the conclusions and
recommendations that follow from analysis of the cases.
F. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Recently, the CASB was reestablished after an absence of
ten years. The disestablishment of the Board in 1980 left no
method of responding to the many cost accounting problems and
issues arising out of the ever-changing business of Department
of Defense procurement. All of the original standards
remained in the Government contracting law, but there was no
one with authority to make needed revisions or issue new
standards as circumstances would dictate. This situation has
led to the formation of a new CASB. [Ref. 1: p. 56]
The new CASB will be examining the existing standards for
problem areas and making revisions where appropriate. They
will also be looking at a myriad of new issues that have
developed over the past ten years, including: cost impact
proposals, special business units, allocation of state income
and franchise tax, material costs, allocation of G&A cost,
mergers and acquisitions, pensions, computer software costs,
technological modernization, and allocation of special
facilities. It is expected that these and other issues will
be the subject of pronouncements by the new CASB. [Ref. 1: p.
56-59]
I I . FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will establish the conceptual framework for
the role of the Cost Accounting Standards in the Government
procurement process. The chapter begins with a historical
look at the establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards
Board (CASB) and the authority that was empowered to the
Board. Then, the four Cost Accounting Standards which are the
focus of this study will be discussed in detail, including the
specific requirements imposed by each of the Standards and any
significant interpretations that have been made by the
Government or Industry since the inception of these Standards.
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
(CASB)
Prior to the establishment of the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CASB), Section XV of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations (ASPR) was the only guide available
for evaluating the cost accounting practices of Government
contractors. In an attempt to provide regulatory guidance,
the ASPR relied heavily on generally accepted accounting
principles, which pertain more to financial accounting
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procedures than to product costing, and IRS rules which have
limited applicability to Government contracting. With these
regulations, it was very possible for firms doing business
with the United States Government using cost reimbursement
contracting to support reimbursement of costs beyond what they
actually incurred in their contract work.
There is no question that industry was opposed to the
imposition of uniform cost accounting standards. In a 1986
study, it was shown that during the period just prior to the
establishment of the CASB when there was serious debate aimed
at establishing the necessity and feasibility of uniform cost
accounting standards, there was an average cumulative
shareholder wealth loss of 2.84% in the defense industry.
These losses were driven mainly by decreases in shareholder
wealth to contractors who were in a less competitive
environment. The study indicates that, at least for the less
competitive contractors, the real possibility of regulated
cost accounting practices would mean decreased profits because
of the firm's inability to extract excessive cost
reimbursements from the Government. [Ref. 2: p. 314]
With increasing technologically advanced systems being
procured and more highly diversified conglomerates dominating
the defense industry, Government officials were becoming more
and more convinced of the need to closely monitor contractor's
costs. The only way to do this successfully would be through
a set of uniform cost accounting standards that could be
consistently applied throughout the multi-faceted defense
industry.
The birth of the CASB can be attributed in large measure
to Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was a strong advocate for a
system of uniform cost accounting standards. In 1968, during
congressional hearings on the extension of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, Admiral Rickover argued that the lack
of uniform cost accounting standards offered the defense
industry an opportunity to increase profits on defense
contracts. Without uniform standards, the Government could
not measure the actual costs of contracts and defense
contractors were able to claim reimbursement for costs not
incidental to the contracts. He further stated that the use
of uniform cost accounting practices would save taxpayers $2
billion per year. [Ref. 2: p. 296]
The position taken by Rickover and other proponents for
congressional action was opposed unanimously by both the
private and public sectors. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), industry associations
and individual Government contractors, the Department of
Defense and the General Accounting Office either strongly
opposed such legislation or asserted the concept was vague and
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argued that it was neither feasible or desirable to impose a
standard accounting system for the myriad of defense
contractors. [Ref. 3: p. 206]
Even under this strong opposition, the congressional CAS
proponents succeeded in enacting a measure which called for a
study to determine the feasibility of applying uniform cost
accounting standards to negotiated prime and subcontracts in
excess of $100,000. The study was conducted by the
Comptroller General, in cooperation with the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and
included consultation with the accounting profession and the
defense industry.
In January 1970, the Comptroller General submitted a
report on the feasibility study to Congress. The report
concluded that it was both feasible and desirable to establish
and apply cost accounting standards to provide a greater
degree of uniformity and consistency in cost accounting than
presently existed. It further recommended that a new
mechanism be established for the development of cost
accounting standards. However, one caveat that the report did
include concerned the limitations of these standards. The
report stated that while establishing standards is feasible
and desirable, it is not feasible to establish and apply cost
accounting standards in such detail as would be necessary to
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ensure a uniform application of precisely prescribed methods
of computing costs for each of the different kinds of costs,
under all the wide variety of circumstances involved in
Government contracting. [Ref. 3: p. 207] From this, it is
evident that the result intended from the study would be the
development of a set of standards or guidelines that would be
very general in nature so that they could be easily
implemented by industry and enforced by the Government without
a massive upheaval of established cost accounting systems and
the ensuing costs that would be involved.
In March 1970, congressional hearings on legislation to
implement the recommendations from the report began. The
hearings in both houses attracted many witnesses with strong
feelings on the issue. In the end, it was determined that a
definite need for cost accounting standards did exist. On
August 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed Public Law 91-
379, an amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, which
established the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB).
The most significant provisions of the statute as it
relates to Government contracting are summarized below. [Ref.
3: p. 208-209]
1. It established the CASB as an agent of Congress
consisting of the Comptroller General, serving as chairman
of the Board, and four members to be appointed by the
Comptroller General. Of these, two must be from the
accounting profession (one of which must be particularly
12
knowledgeable about the cost accounting problems of small
business), and one each from industry and a federal agency.
2. It gave the Board authority to promulgate cost accounting
standards designed to achieve uniformity and consistency in
the cost accounting principles followed by defense
contractors and subcontractors under Federal contracts.
Once promulgated, the standards must be used by all relevant
Federal agencies and by defense contractors and
subcontractors in estimating, accumulating, and reporting
costs in connection with pricing, administration and
settlement of all negotiated prime contract and subcontract
national defense procurements with the U.S. in excess of
$100,000. The only exceptions being where the price
negotiated is based on; (1) established catalog or market
prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to
the general public, or (2) prices set by law or regulation.
3. It required that the CASB in promulgating a standard must
report to the Congress the probable costs of implementation
compared to the probable benefits, including advantages and
improvements in the pricing, administration, and settlement
of contracts.
4. It required defense contractors and subcontractors to
disclose in writing their cost accounting principles
(Disclosure Statement) and to agree to a contract price
adjustment for any increased costs paid to the contractor
because of non-compliance with the standards or failure to
consistently follow their disclosed cost accounting
principles. Disputes would be handled under the contract
dispute clause.
5. In order to enforce implementation and adherence, it gave
any authorized representative of the head of the agency
concerned, of the Board, or of the Comptroller General, the
authority to examine and make copies of any documents,
papers, or records of the contractor or subcontractor
relating to compliance with the standards and disclosed cost
accounting principles.
In late 1970, Congress passed the necessary bill to
implement the Statute and it was signed into law early in
January, 1971. The first CASB meeting was held on February 9,
13
1971. The following month, the Board's first executive
secretary was named and he assumed duties on April 1, 1971.
Thereafter, recruitment of the other staff members began, as
did planning and research for the promulgation of standards
and regulations to meet the requirements established by law.
[Ref. 3: p. 210]
C. THE ROLE OF OTHER GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Different Government organizations have varying roles with
regard to implementation, interpretation and audit of the Cost
Accounting Standards. Since the CASB was dissolved in 1980,
these functions have been left largely to the Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC), the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA), the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
,
the Federal Courts, and the General Accounting Office (GAO).
DCMC is the principal Government organization for contract
administration. Within the DCMC field offices, Administrative
Contracting Officers (ACO) are assigned responsibility for
administration of Government contracts. This includes the
responsibility of ensuring that Government contractors and
subcontractors are in compliance with all the requirements of
the Cost Accounting Standards. When conflicts arise involving
the Standards, the ACO must make decisions relative to the
contractor's compliance, -evaluate the cost impact of non-
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compliance, and negotiate an equitable adjustment of the
contract price.
DCAA was established for the purpose of performing all
necessary contract auditing for the Department of Defense and
providing accounting and financial advisory services in
connection with the negotiation, administration, and
settlement of contracts and subcontracts. The DCAA auditor
does not possess any decision making authority, but rather
conducts audits and reports findings and recommendations to
the ACO for action. In regard to the Cost Accounting
Standards, the cognizant contract auditor is responsible for
making recommendations to the ACO as to whether: [Ref. 4: p.
805]
a. A contractor's Disclosure Statement, submitted as a
condition of contracting, adequately describes the actual
or proposed cost accounting practices.
b. A contractor's disclosed cost accounting practices are
in compliance with FAR Part 31 and applicable Cost
Accounting Standards.
c. A contractor's or subcontractor's failure to comply
with applicable Cost Accounting Standards or to follow
consistently its disclosed cost accounting practices has
resulted, or may result, in any increased cost paid by the
Government.
d. A contractor's or subcontractor's proposed price
changes, submitted as a result of changes made to
previously disclosed or established cost accounting
practices, are fair and reasonable.
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The ASBCA, Federal Courts and GAO are all involved in the
interpretation of the Standards through adjudication of
disputes and protests. When the ACO and the contractor are
unable to negotiate and settle differences, litigation is
initiated by issuance of a contracting officer's "final
decision" and appeal of that decision by the contractor. The
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provided that agency heads
appoint boards of contract appeals to decide issues. If the
contractor does not agree with the decision of the ASBCA, they
have the right to appeal up to the Federal Courts. [Ref. 5: p.
63]
The GAO has primary responsibility for reviewing bid
protest and award protest cases. These cases typically
involve the method of conducting the source selection
evaluation, qualification of the low bidder, or the
responsiveness of the bidder who was awarded the contract.
Issues relative to the Cost Accounting Standards could be
raised during the review. If the contractor does not agree
with the decision of the GAO they have the right to appeal up
to the Federal Courts.
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D. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD (CAS) 401
CAS 401, Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating and
Reporting Costs, became effective on July 1, 1972. It is
fundamentally the most basic of all the standards in
attempting to achieve uniformity and consistency in cost
accounting practices. The purpose of CAS 401 as stated by the
CASB is: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.401-20]
. . . to ensure that each contractor's practices used in
estimating costs for a proposal are consistent with cost
accounting practices used by him in accumulating and
reporting costs. Consistency in the application of cost
accounting practices is necessary to enhance the
likelihood that comparable transactions are treated alike.
With respect to individual contracts, the consistent
application of cost accounting practices will facilitate
the preparation of reliable cost estimates used in pricing
a proposal and their comparison with the costs of
performance of the resulting contract. Such comparisons
provide one important basis for financial control over
costs during contract performance and aid in establishing
accountability for costs in the manner agreed to by both
parties at the time of contracting. The comparisons also
provide an improved basis for evaluating estimating
capabilities.
The purpose of CAS 401 as stated above gets to the very
heart of why the CASB was established. It provides a means of
measuring the costs on contracts in a more consistent manner
in order to facilitate financial control over contractors.
This is the very thing that Admiral Rickover was seeking
during his address to Congress. CAS 401 was designed to
facilitate reliable cost estimates that could easily be
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compared with actual cost data in order to enhance financial
control over costs, accountability for cost overruns and a
basis for evaluating a contractor's cost estimating system.
To implement CAS 401, the CASB promulgated three
fundamental requirements: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.401-40]
a. A contractor's practices used in estimating costs in
pricing a proposal shall be consistent with his cost
accounting practices used in accumulating and reporting
costs.
b. A contractor's cost accounting practices used in
accumulating and reporting actual costs for a contract
shall be consistent with his practices used in estimating
costs in pricing the related proposal
.
c. The grouping of homogeneous costs in estimates prepared
for proposal purposes shall not per se be deemed an
inconsistent application of cost accounting practices
under paragraphs a and b when such costs are accumulated
and reported in greater detail on an actual cost basis
during contract performance.
In the Techniques For Application section of the Standard,
the CASB describes in greater detail what it meant by the word
consistent . The three main points in the consistent
application of costs are: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.401-50]
1. The classification of costs as direct or indirect .
2. The indirect cost pools to which each element or
function of cost is charged or proposed to be charged.
3. The methods of allocating indirect costs to the
contract.
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E. INTERPRETATIONS OF CAS 401
1. Data-Design Laboratories, ASBCA No. 27245, 86-2 BCA
par. 18,830.
In this case the dispute did not result from a
contracting officer's final determination of non-compliance
with CAS 401. But rather, one of the main issues that this
case focused on was whether a retroactive cost disallowance
imposed by a contracting officer could be upheld by the ASBCA
in view of the requirements of CAS 401.
Data-Design Laboratories (DDL) was made up of three
divisions, Technical Services, Instruments and Hydrotronics
.
The three divisions had one combined G&A expense pool,
however, Technical Services and Instruments had one combined
overhead cost pool while Hydrotronics had its own. The
Instruments Division was mainly involved in manufacturing
operations, while the Technical Services Division was mainly
involved in engineering technical services. In the early
1970 's about 40% of the sales of the Technical Services
Division involved manufacturing, but in the FY 1978-80 period
it dropped to a much lower level, as low as 3%. The
Instruments Division contracts were all fixed price, whereas
the Technical Services Division contracts were almost all cost
plus fixed fee. Before 1976, the Government voiced no
objection to DDL's use of a single overhead pool for these two
19
divisions. Significant changes occurred in the volume of
sales and production of DDL's Instruments Division from FY
1975 to FY 1976 and subsequent years. For example, sales
changed from $365,000 in FY 1975 to $1,334,000 in FY 1976.
The Government considered that because of the increase
in sales and production of the Instruments Division, this
combined overhead pool no longer allocated overhead costs
accurately. This pool was allocated on the basis of direct
labor dollars, and engineers were being paid substantially
more than manufacturing personnel. Manufacturing overhead
costs were considered to be improperly shifted from
manufacturing operations to engineering operations.
After discussions with the contractor, a written
agreement was entered into between the Government and DDL
whereby DDL agreed to establish a separate overhead pool for
each division. DDL submitted a formal accounting practice
change setting up the separate overhead pools, which was in
accordance with the written agreement and which was approved
by the Government. At the same time DDL also submitted a
formal accounting practice change from a total cost input (sum
of material labor and factory overhead costs) to a value added
base (e.g. direct labor) for the allocation of G&A. This
request was disapproved by the Government. DDL then withdrew
both accounting practice change requests and after having
20
followed the two pool method for about two months changed back
to their old system. While it was not stipulated in the
written agreement, DDL had thought from prior discussions that
the Government would allow an offsetting change in the way DDL
accounted for G&A expense.
The two issues that the ASBCA examined in deciding
this case were, the applicability of the written agreement,
and the requirements of CAS 401. Specifically, whether CAS
401 by its very nature precludes a contracting officer from
imposing a retroactive cost disallowance where a retroactive
change in the accounting practice of a contractor would lead
to an inconsistency between estimating and accumulating of
costs
.
In making their decision the ASBCA looked to a letter
that had been sent by the CASB to DOD in November 1973 which
addressed this very issue. Shortly after CAS 401 became
effective, DOD was concerned that it would preclude a
retroactive change in a contractor's accounting practice even
when a contractor's previously established and/or disclosed
accounting practice is subsequently considered to yield
inequitable results under one or more CAS covered contracts.
The CASB's formal advice to DOD was twofold. First,
changes in established cost accounting practices during
contract performance may be made when authorized by standards,
21
rules, and regulations issued by the CASB and that
modifications of established cost accounting practices for
accumulating and reporting costs are permitted by other
regulations of the CASB without causing a violation of CAS
401. The letter referred specifically to the Cost Accounting
Standards Contract clause, paragraph (a)(4)(B), which states
that a change to cost accounting practices during performance
of a contract may be proposed by either the Government or the
contractor. The second and somewhat contradictory bit of
advice that the CASB put in the letter was: [Ref. 7: p.
94,884-94,885]
A consequence of the CASB standards, rules, and
regulations may be to make it more difficult for the party
advocating change to persuade a board or court to support
its position. We believe that this might be the case
primarily because consistency in cost accounting practices
has been explicitly identified as a characteristic
generally meriting protection. This identification can be
found not only in the standards issued by the Board but
also in the underlying language of its legislation.
Paragraph (g) of Public Law 91-379 (establishing the CASB)
requires the Board to promulgate Cost Accounting Standards
designed to achieve uniformity and consistency. In
prescribing this requirement, we believe that the Congress
recognized that in the long run the value of consistency
would more than compensate for any transitory advantages
which might be lost as a result of inhibitions imposed on
changing cost accounting practices to accommodate
temporary conditions.
From this, DOD concluded that a retroactive
disallowance under certain circumstances was not contrary to
CAS 401. The ASBCA decided that this case did not present the
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appropriate circumstances for a retroactive disallowance and
found that DDL was entitled to reasonably adequate notice that
the Government would no longer approve the use of their
accounting practice.
The ASBCA's interpretation of the applicability of CAS
401 seems to be consistent with that of the CASB. The CASB
recognized that CAS 401 may put some limitations on the
Government's absolute authority to retroactively disallow a
contractor's accounting practice when it felt justified.
However, any limitations that might be imposed were worthwhile
because of the greater importance to maintain consistency in
estimating, accumulating and reporting costs. The CASB
recognized that each case would have to be weighed on its own
merits to see if the imposition of a retroactive change was
justified and would provide a greater good than maintaining
consistency. In this case, the ASBCA decided that maintaining
consistency and fairness was of greatest importance.
2. Dayton T. Brown, ASBCA No . 22810, 78-2 BCA par . 13 , 484;
80-2 BCA par. 14, 543.
This case involves a contracting officer's final
determination of non-compliance with CAS 401 regarding the
contractor's method of accounting for bid and proposal (B&P)
costs. The contractor appealed the decision to the ASBCA who
found for the contractor, then after rehearing the case under
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the Government's motion for reconsideration ruled against the
contractor.
Brown was a small company consisting of a corporate
office and three divisions; Manufacturing, Laboratory and
Technical. Manufacturing had virtually no Government
contracts while the other two were heavily defense-oriented.
Prior to 1975, Brown collected its B&P costs in its corporate
headquarters G&A pool and then reallocated these costs back to
the divisions on a total cost input basis. The result being
a disproportionate allocation of B&P to the commercial
Manufacturing Division because it incurred little B&P work but
had the largest cost input base. The Government had no
objection to this practice. [Ref. 8: p. 65,977]
In 1975, Brown's commercial business began to fall off
and the company increased its B&P efforts in the Manufacturing
Division significantly. This resulted in an increase in total
company B&P costs which then required Brown to use the ASPR
formula for determining the allowability of B&P costs. In
computing B&P costs for 1975 using the formula, Brown changed
its procedure by applying the formula after the B&P costs had
been allocated to the divisions. DCAA recomputed allowable
B&P costs by applying the formula at the corporate level and
arrived at a substantial amount of B&P costs questioned. The
major portion of the amount disallowed represented a lesser
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allocation of these costs to the defense-oriented divisions.
[Ref. 9: p. 71,687]
In arriving at its initial decision for Brown, the
ASBCA only concerned itself with the propriety, under the ASPR
provisions, of Brown's computing its allowable 1975 B&P costs
by applying the formula to its divisional level. As such, it
concluded that Brown had not violated the requirements of CAS
401. It reasoned that CAS 401 requires consistency between
accumulating and reporting costs, on the one hand, and
estimating costs on the other, not between accumulating costs
and reporting costs as in this case. Also, since Brown did
not use the formula for estimating in 1975, it would be an
impossibility for there to be an inconsistency between its
application of the formula in reporting its costs in 1975 and
in estimating costs for that year.
The ASBCA agreed to rehear the case under the
Government's motion for reconsideration. The Government was
able to clarify its position, and asked the Board to consider
whether Brown's reporting of its incurred B&P costs at the
division level constitutes an inconsistency prohibited by CAS
401 in view of its accounting practice to estimate these costs
by using indirectly allocated costs at the corporate level.
The Board reversed its initial decision by concluding that
Brown had violated CAS 401. The Board ruled that the
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inconsistency prohibited by CAS 401 arose from Brown's
reporting its allowable B&P costs based on incurred divisional
costs, which was inconsistent with its established accounting
practice of estimating B&P costs on the basis of their
allocation from the corporate G&A expense pool. [Ref. 9: p.
71,691]
This case presents a classic example of the type of
situation where CAS 401 is designed to be applied. If a
contractor were allowed to estimate costs using one method,
and accumulate and report costs using another, then it would
be impossible to hold the contractor accountable for costs.
The contractor would have free reign to estimate low, in order
to win the award, and then allocate costs as high as possible,
in order to increase his profit margin. The difference in
Brown's methods of estimating and accumulating is subtle but
nevertheless can be used quite conveniently to manipulate
costs. There is no question that both the Government and the
ASBCA were correct in their interpretation of CAS 401 in this
case
.
3. Texas Instruments, Inc., ASBCA No. 18621, 79-1 BCA
par. 13,800; 79-2 BCA par. 14, 184.
This case is based on a contracting officer's final
determination of non-compliance with CAS 401. The
Government's position was that Texas Instruments' (TI) cost
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accounting practices in not accumulating and reporting costs
by individual contracts, are inconsistent with its estimating
practices which, in the Government's opinion, are based on a
single contract. The ASBCA did not agree and ruled in favor
of TI.
The controversy surrounds TI's cost accounting system.
For fixed-price supply contracts, TI does not accumulate costs
by individual contract but instead the cost accounting system
is based on accumulating costs by projects. Projects relate
costs to identical or similar products, based on commonalities
of subassemblies, parts, etc., regardless of the origin for
the order of the products. The system is designed to allow TI
to buy large quantities of material at lower costs instead of
making buys on an as needed basis for individual contracts.
[Ref. 10: p. 67,607]
The Government contends that since TI uses DD Form 633
(used to develop the cost estimate for a proposal) to estimate
costs for an individual contract, then the accumulation and
reporting of costs must also be on a single contract basis in
order to comply with CAS 401. TI argued that its estimating
practices were consistent with its cost accounting practices
in accumulating and reporting costs since both produced
average costs of a unit or a part as necessary. TI contends
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that DD Form 633 in itself is not indicative of its estimating
practices
.
The Board did not agree with the Government's
contentions and found that since the costs on the DD Form 633
were based on historical cost data derived from the various
projects and represented the average costs of many units
manufactured under many contracts, they did not represent the
costs incurred under a single contract. Further, the Board
concluded that CAS 401 does not require accumulation,
reporting, and estimating of costs by individual contracts.
To the contrary, the Board found evidence that the CASB
intentionally left out any language that referred to
"individual contracts" when the final draft of CAS 401 was
submitted. [Ref. 10: p. 67,618-67,621]
The Government's interpretation of CAS 401 in this
case was way off base. The CASB never intended such a strict
interpretation as evidenced by the careful exclusion of any
references to "individual contracts" in CAS 401. To follow
that fine an interpretation would go against the findings of
the feasibility study which called for standards to be
developed but guarded against defining too finely the exact
practices to be used by contractors. This would cause an
unnecessary upheaval in contractors' cost accounting systems.
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Consistency can be achieved without imposing massive costs on
industry.
In this case, TI was being consistent in their
practice of estimating, accumulating and reporting costs and
the fact that they were using the DD Form 633, as required, to
submit a cost proposal is inconsequential to their consistent
application of costs.
F. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD (CAS) 402
CAS 402, CONSISTENCY IN ALLOCATING COSTS INCURRED FOR THE
SAME PURPOSE, was issued at the same time as CAS 401 and has
an effective date of July 1, 1972. The purpose of CAS 402 as
stated by the CASB is: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.402-20]
. . . to require that each type of cost is allocated only
once and on only one basis to any contract or other cost
objective. The criteria for determining the allocation of
costs to a product, contract, or other cost objective
should be the same for all similar objectives. Adherence
to these cost accounting concepts is necessary to guard
against the overcharging of some cost objectives and to
prevent double counting. Double counting occurs most
commonly when cost items are allocated directly to a cost
objective without eliminating like cost items from
indirect cost pools which are allocated to that cost
objective
.
Similar to CAS 401, CAS 402 is attempting to legislate
consistency in the way costs are allocated to contracts in
order to facilitate the auditing process and prevent the gross
overstatement of costs. Basically, the CASB felt it was
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necessary to tell industry something that should have been
intuitively obvious, that is to treat like costs alike and
don't charge a cost off to a contract more than once.
The fundamental requirement imposed on contractors by CAS
402 is: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.402-40]
All costs incurred for the same purpose, in like
circumstances, are either direct costs only or indirect
costs only with respect to final cost objectives. No
final cost objective shall have allocated to it as an
indirect cost any cost, if other costs incurred for the
same purpose, in like circumstances, have been included as
a direct cost of that or any other final cost objective.
Further, no final cost objective shall have allocated to
it as a direct cost any cost, if other costs incurred for
the same purpose, in like circumstances, have been
included in any direct cost pool to be allocated to that
or any other final cost objective.
The "Techniques for Application" section of the Standard
further defines exactly what is required of contractor's to be
in compliance with CAS 402. The five main points that this
section brings out are: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.402-50]
a. CAS 402 is not only applicable to actual costs incurred
but is also equally applicable to estimates of costs to be
incurred as used in contract proposals.
b. The contractor will specify in the Disclosure Statement
his cost accounting practices with regard to the
distinction between direct and indirect costs. Also, for
those types of costs which are sometimes accounted for as
direct and sometimes accounted for as indirect, the
contractor will set forth in his Disclosure Statement the
specific criteria and circumstances for making such
distinctions. Thus, the Disclosure Statement is very
important as it becomes the main vehicle used to determine
whether or not costs are incurred for the same purpose.
30
c. If the contractor has not submitted a Disclosure
Statement, the determination of whether specific costs are
directly allocable to contracts shall be based on the
contractor's cost accounting practices used at the time of
contract proposal
.
d. Whenever costs which serve the same purpose cannot
equitably be indirectly allocated to one or more final
cost objectives in accordance with the contractor's
disclosed accounting practices, the contractor may either
(a) use a method for reassigning all such costs which
would provide an equitable distribution to all final cost
objectives, or (b) directly assign all such costs to final
cost objectives with which they are specifically
identified. In the event the contractor decides to make a
change for either purpose, the Disclosure Statement shall
be amended to reflect the revised accounting practices
involved.
e. A direct cost of minor dollar amount may be treated as
an indirect cost for reasons of practicality where the
accounting treatment for the cost is consistently applied
to all final cost objectives, provided that such treatment
produces results which are substantially the same as the
results which would have been obtained if the cost had
been treated as a direct cost.
The key words in applying CAS 402 are, "costs incurred for
the same purpose in like circumstances." Because although a
cost may be incurred for the same general purpose and charged
indirectly, a portion of that cost may be incurred for some
more specific purpose which would permit that portion of the
cost to be charged directly to the applicable final cost
objective. The bottom line for auditors is that a thorough
examination of the facts must be conducted before a contractor
can be assumed to be in non-compliance. [Ref. 4: p. 827]
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G. INTERPRETATIONS OF CAS 402
1. Cost Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 1
One of the significant problems that surfaced with the
publication of CAS 402 was the application of the Standard to
bid and proposal (B&P) costs. Contractors were using a wide
variety of methods to account for B&P costs and so the CASB
felt it was necessary to officially take a position on the
accounting treatment of these costs. On June 18, 1976,
Interpretation No. 1 to CAS 402 was published in its final
form in the Federal Register and stated in part that: [Ref . 6:
Subpart 30.402-61]
costs incurred in preparing, submitting, and
supporting proposals pursuant to a specific requirement of
an existing contract are considered to have been incurred
in different circumstances from the circumstances under
which costs are incurred in preparing proposals which do
not result from such specific requirement. The
circumstances are different because the costs of preparing
proposals specifically required by the provisions of an
existing contract relate only to that contract while other
proposal costs relate to all work of the contractor.
What the CASB is essentially saying is that B&P costs
may be charged directly when they are incurred pursuant to the
specific requirement of an existing contract, such as proposal
costs incurred in connection with the definitization of letter
contracts, orders issued under basic ordering agreements or
modifications to an existing contract. Other B&P costs which
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relate to all work of the contractor must be charged
indirectly.
This interpretation reinforces the idea that when
applying CAS 402 it is important to remember that even though
costs may be alike, they can be accounted for differently if
some costs are incurred for a specific purpose and can be
traced directly to a final cost objective.
2. Comptroller General's Decision No. B-216516, November
19, 1984.
This Comptroller General's decision was made pursuant
to a bid protest by CACI, Inc., contending that the
Government's evaluation of its proposal was in violation of
CAS 402. In evaluating the bids for a certain contract, the
Government lowered the cost proposal of the highest bidder and
increased the cost proposal of CACI, which had submitted the
lowest proposal. The Government felt that the accounting
function for this contract required the assignment of
dedicated personnel and that these costs should be charged
direct. Because of the changes the Government made in the
cost proposals, CACI was no longer low bidder and did not get
the award. CACI protested the award asserting that they had
historically accounted for accounting costs as indirect costs
and to change that practice for this contract would be in
violation of CAS 402. [Ref. 3: p. 261]
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The Government argued that because dedicated
accounting personnel are necessary and can be identifiable
with a particular final cost objective, the cost must be
charged as a direct cost to the contract. However, the GAO
did not agree. In its decision, the GAO pointed out that if
CACI charged the accounting function as indirect under other
contracts, it must be consistent under this contract. The
decision also pointed out that if this contract required
something different from CACI's ordinary accounting functions,
then it is possible that CACI could elect to charge this as a
direct cost. However, even in this event it would be CACI's
initial election of how it wanted to manage its accounting
system, so long as CACI complied with CAS. GAO found that the
Government improperly added the accounting function as a
direct charge and thus was not following the provisions of CAS
402. [Ref. 3: p. 262]
The decision made by the GAO was significant because
it prevented the Government from taking an action that was
contrary to the Cost Accounting Standards. In relation to CAS
402 it reinforced the CASB ' s intention to promote consistency
in allocating costs, even if that meant disallowing certain
actions on the part of the Government.
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H. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD (CAS) 405
CAS 405, ACCOUNTING FOR UNALLOWABLE COSTS, became
effective on January 1, 1974. The purpose of CAS 405 as
stated by the CASB is: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.405-20]
... to facilitate the negotiation, audit, administration
and settlement of contracts by establishing guidelines
covering (1) identification of costs specifically
described as unallowable, at the time such costs first
become defined or authoritatively designated as
unallowable, and (2) the cost accounting treatment to be
accorded such identified unallowable costs in order to
promote the consistent application of sound cost
accounting principles covering all incurred costs.
CAS 405 is not concerned with the designation of costs or
certain classes of costs as unallowable, that function is left
to the appropriate procurement or reviewing authority and is
covered quite thoroughly in FAR Part 31. Instead, CAS 405 is
concerned with the identification of these costs by the
contractor and the accounting treatment afforded these costs.
The CASB felt that the failure of contractors to identify
unallowable costs, the lack of uniformity or comparability in
the cost accounting treatment accorded unallowable costs and
the reported problems concerning the content of indirect-cost
allocation bases where unallowable costs are involved, were
sufficient justification for establishing CAS 405 [Ref. 6:
Part 30, App. A, p. 1-17].
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The requirements imposed on contractors by CAS 405 as
contained in the Standard are: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.405-40]
a. Costs expressly unallowable or mutually agreed to be
unallowable, including costs mutually agreed to be
unallowable directly associated costs, shall be identified
and excluded from any billing, claim, or proposal
applicable to a Government contract.
b. Costs which specifically become designated as
unallowable as a result of a written decision furnished by
a contracting officer pursuant to contract disputes
procedures shall be identified if included in or used in
the computation of any billing, claim, or proposal
applicable to a Government contract. This identification
requirement applies also to any costs incurred for the
same purpose under like circumstances as the costs
specifically identified as unallowable under either this
paragraph or paragraph (a).
c. Costs which, in a contracting officer's written
decision furnished pursuant to contract disputes
procedures, are designated as unallowable directly
associated costs of unallowable costs covered by either
paragraph (a) or (b) shall be accorded the identification
required by paragraph (b)
.
d. The costs of any work project not contractually
authorized, whether or not related to performance of a
proposed or existing contract, shall be accounted for, to
the extent appropriate, in a manner which permits ready
separation from the costs of authorized work projects.
e. All unallowable costs covered by paragraphs (a) through
(d) shall be subject to the same cost accounting
principles governing cost allocability as allowable costs.
In circumstances where these unallowable costs normally
would be part of a regular indirect-cost allocation base
or bases, they shall remain in such base or bases. Where
a directly associated cost is part of a category of costs
normally included in an indirect-cost pool that will be
allocated over a base containing the unallowable cost with
which it is associated, such a directly associated cost
shall be retained in * the indirect-cost pool and be
allocated through the regular allocation process.
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f. Where the total of the allocable and otherwise
allowable costs exceeds a limitation-of-cost or ceiling-
price provision in a contract, full direct and indirect
cost allocation shall be made to the contract cost
objective, in accordance with established cost accounting
practices and Standards which regularly govern a given
entity's allocations to Government contract cost
objectives. In any determination of unallowable cost
overrun, the amount thereof shall be identified in terms
of the excess of allowable costs over the ceiling amount,
rather than through specific identification of particular
cost items or cost elements.
Industry was outspokenly opposed to much of the language
contained in CAS 405, but by far the most criticism was
addressed to the requirement that unallowable costs shall be
subject to the same cost accounting requirements as allowable
costs in determining the content of cost-oriented bases for
allocation of indirect costs. However, the CASB in replying
to the criticism indicated that the issues concerning cost
allocation and those relating to cost allowance are distinct
and separate. Further, allowability should not be a factor in
the selection or in the determination of the content of an
allocation base used to distribute a pool of indirect costs,
and the appropriateness of a particular allocation base should
be determined primarily in terms of its distributive
characteristics. The CASB felt that any selective
fragmentation of an allocation base which eliminates given
base elements for only some of the relevant cost objectives
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would produce a distortion in the resulting allocations. [Ref
.
6: Part 30, App. A, p. 1-19]
As was its standard practice, the CASB carefully reviewed
all criticism of a proposed Standard and made changes as it
felt were appropriate. In the case of CAS 405, few changes
were made because the CASB believed that the application of
CAS 405 would provide a greater degree of uniformity in the
determination of costs of negotiated defense contracts.
I . INTERPRETATIONS OF CAS 405
1. Emerson Electric Company, ASBCA No. 30090, 87-1 BCA
par. 19478.
This case concerns the Emerson Electric Company's
appeal of a contracting officer's final decision of non-
compliance with CAS 405. The circumstances of the case relate
to the specificity that a regulation must contain in order for
a cost to be considered "expressly unallowable" according to
CAS 405.
The non-compliance issue involves the inclusion of
foreign selling costs in the G&A expense pool and thus the
eventual allocation of these alleged unallowable costs to
Government contracts. During the period from 1 October 1979
to 3 August 1983, Emerson calculated its G&A expense rate for
DOD domestic contracts on" a single pool basis. In computing
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this rate, all G&A expenses incurred by Emerson, including all
selling costs, were collected in a single pool which after
excluding any expressly unallowable costs was divided by the
total costs incurred by Emerson during the fiscal year. Under
this method, foreign military products selling costs were not
excluded from Emerson's single G&A pool. [Ref. 11: p. 98,415]
The ACO determined that foreign military products
selling costs were unallowable costs for U.S. Government
contracts based on the provisions of the Defense Acquisition
Regulation, 15-205. 37(b) (the pertinent regulation prior to
the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Supplement
to the FAR), which states that selling costs are allowable to
the extent they are reasonable and are allocable to Government
business, and that selling costs incurred in connection with
potential and actual foreign sales of military products shall
not be allocable to U.S. Government contracts. Emerson
contends that this regulation does not expressly state that
foreign selling costs are unallowable and thus are not subject
to the accounting requirements of CAS 405. In deciding the
case the ASBCA must attempt to interpret what the CASB meant
by "expressly unallowable" and relate that to the DAR
provision in order to determine the applicability of CAS 405.
In order to try and interpret what the CASB meant by
"expressly unallowable," the ASBCA looked at the published
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preambles which accompany each Cost Accounting Standard and
serve as the official legislative history of the Standard. In
the preamble to CAS 405, explaining the intended meaning of
the phrase "expressly unallowable," the CASB stated: [Ref. 6:
Part 30, App. A, p. 1-18]
Most of the items of cost that are of the type required to
be accounted for as expressly unallowable are specified in
agency procurement regulations. It would not be practical
to list the items of cost that may be made expressly
unallowable under the specific provisions of contracts.
The Board, in its definition of an "expressly unallowable
cost, " has used the word "expressly" in the broad
dictionary sense - that which is in direct or unmistakable
terms
.
The ASBCA then applied this to the DAR provision and
found that while the DAR provision could have been more direct
if the words "unallowable" or "not recoverable" had been used,
nevertheless the meaning imparted by the DAR provision was
unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the ASBCA found that the DAR
provision clearly makes foreign military products selling
costs "expressly unallowable" under domestic Government
contracts, and thus Emerson was in non-compliance with CAS
405.
This case can certainly be held up as an example to
contractor's who may try to evade the requirements of CAS 405
through twists in the wording of the Standard and applicable
agency regulations. The ACO and the ASBCA recognized that the
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provisions of a Government regulation making a cost
unallowable cannot be voided through literal interpretations
of the wording. Rather, one must interpret the meaning and
apply some deductive reasoning to come up with a logical
conclusion concerning the allowability of costs and compliance
with CAS 405.
J. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD (CAS) 418
CAS 418, ALLOCATION OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS, was over
two years in the making before it was finally promulgated, and
took up most of the CASB's time during its final few years of
existence. CAS 418 started out as five separate standards,
was subsequently pared down to three separate standards after
the CASB received much criticism of the five standards, and
was finally neatly packaged into one standard (again due to
significant criticism of the three standards) which became
effective on September 20, 1980. The purpose of CAS 418 as
stated by the CASB is: [Ref. 6: Subpart 30.418-20]
(a) to provide for consistent determination of direct and
indirect costs, (b) to provide criteria for the
accumulation of indirect costs, including service center
and overhead costs, in indirect cost pools, and (c) to
provide guidance relating to the selection of allocation
measures based on the beneficial or causal relationship
between an indirect cost pool and cost objectives.
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CAS 418 is concerned with the consistent classification of
costs as direct and indirect, and the proper allocation of
indirect costs to cost objectives. In order to achieve this,
the CASB established the following fundamental requirements:
[Ref. 6: Subpart 30.418-40]
a. A business unit shall have a written statement of
accounting policies and practices for classifying costs as
direct or indirect which shall be consistently applied.
b. Indirect costs shall be accumulated in indirect cost
pools which are homogeneous.
c. Pooled costs shall be allocated to cost objectives in
reasonable proportion to the beneficial or causal
relationship of the pooled costs to cost objectives.
Also included in the requirements was definitive guidance
on the allocation base to be selected. While the researcher
feels that it is not necessary for the purposes of this study
to include that guidance here, it is interesting to note that
the requirements on allocation base selection were by far more
definitive than had ever appeared before in a Government
regulation. It was also the subject of much criticism by
Industry representatives who feared it would require
significant changes in their cost accounting practices.
However, the CASB concluded that definitive guidance in this
area was necessary in order to achieve the level of uniformity
and consistency that was desired.
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However, in another area but somewhat related, the CASB
did agree with the criticisms made by Industry. It had to do
with the concept of materiality and the unnecessary
proliferation of expense pools and changes in cost accounting
practices, and the substantial costs that such changes would
generate without producing any practical impact on Government
contract costs. In the prefatory comments to CAS 418 the CASB
addressed this issue by saying: [ Ref . 3: p. 343]
. . . the Board recognizes that this Standard may have a
pervasive impact on contractor accounting systems.
Because of this, the Board here and in the Standard is
emphasizing the necessity to evaluate any perceived need
for change in cost accounting practices in terms of
materiality. The need to evaluate the materiality of a
change in cost accounting practice applies to all
provisions of the Standard. It is not limited to those
particular provisions of the Standard in which materiality
is mentioned for emphasis.
These strong comments certainly indicate that the CASB was
concerned that implementation of CAS 418 would mean
unnecessary and costly changes in contractor's cost accounting
practices. The comment emphasizes that above all else,
auditors and contracting officers must evaluate the
materiality of the situation before concluding that CAS 418




K. INTERPRETATIONS OF CAS 418
The researcher could not identify through the FLITE
research system any significant interpretations of CAS 418
that have come to the litigation or disputes stage. The
reason for this could be that the requirements of CAS 418 are
covered in much more specific terms under other Cost
Accounting Standards dealing with cost allocation, such as CAS
403, 410 and 420. These other standards would then be more
useful to the auditor. Whatever the reason, there has been
little open dispute over CAS 418. However, the DCAA did
promulgate interpretative guidance to its auditors on CAS 418.
In regard to the requirement for a written statement of
policy for classifying costs as direct or indirect, DCAA
concluded that the auditor should review the Disclosure
Statement for the necessary information. Only if the
Disclosure Statement was insufficient should the auditor
request additional detail. Part III, "Direct vs. Indirect,"
Item 3.1.0, of the Disclosure Statement should serve this
purpose for most contractors and relieve them of unnecessary
duplication of effort.
On the subject of materiality, DCAA advised its auditors
that, "the creation of additional indirect cost pools should
be required only if changes will result in materially
different cost allocations." Also, "homogeneity of indirect
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cost pools is a significant requirement of the standard;
however, a pool may be considered homogeneous if the separate
allocation of costs of the dissimilar activities would not
result in a materially different allocation of cost to cost
objectives." [Ref. 4: p. 871] The materiality criteria to be
used by DCAA are contained in FAR Part 30.305.
DCAA, just as the CASB had intended, has advised its
auditors that materiality is a priority when applying CAS 418.
They have reemphasized what the CASB had stated in its
prefatory comments, recognizing that there is no need to
require costly changes in cost accounting practices if no
material change in cost allocation will result.
L . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented background on the establishment
of the CASB as well as detail on four of the Standards
promulgated by the Board. The CASB was established by
Congress in order to apply uniformity and consistency in the
cost accounting practices employed by contractors. The CASB
understood their role not as one to dictate specific cost
accounting practices to be used but rather ensuring the
consistent and equitable application of the practice once it
was chosen. The key to success of having Cost Accounting
Standards is for Government and Industry to be able to
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understand and interpret them in unison as the CASB had
intended.
A full discussion has been presented of each of the four
Standards that will be profiled in subsequent chapters. This
included the specific requirements imposed by the CASB and
some examples of the different ways that each Standard could
be interpreted and implemented by both Government and
Industry. This should give the reader a good feel for the
types of issues that exist in the application of the Cost
Accounting Standards.
Each one of the Standards profiled in this chapter has
been a problem for the American Electronics Corporation. The
problems concern implementation and interpretation issues that
involve the company, DCAA, and the ACO. The following three
chapters will each contain a separate case study of a CAS non-
compliance, focusing on these issues and their eventual
resolution.
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III. CASE 1: COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 401 AND 402
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the company
which is the subject of these case studies, and then present
the first Cost Accounting Standards non-compliance case. The
information presented on the company's background is pertinent
for all the cases involved in this study, and will not be
repeated in subsequent chapters.
The first case involves Cost Accounting Standards 401 and
402, which are presented together because the company was
charged with non-compliance of these two Standards on one
particular issue. The facts of the case will be presented in
detail from the time the initial finding was first reported
through to the final negotiation and settlement. This will
then be followed by a summary and analysis of the issues in
this case.
B. BACKGROUND ON AMERICAN ELECTRONICS CORPORATION (AEC)
American Electronics Corporation (AEC) was founded in
Northern California in 1966 and has steadily grown to become
a leader in the design, manufacture and operation of
electronic and computer "systems. These systems provide a
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variety of functions including satellite communications,
navigation, earth observation, and tracking, telemetry and
control for both fixed stations as well as ground mobile and
airborne users. In addition, the company performs important
system engineering functions in the design of the next-
generation air traffic control systems, and major new NASA and
DOD space programs. AEC does about 40 percent of its sales
both as a prime and subcontractor with the U.S. Government and
the remainder with commercial customers.
AEC is comprised of two separate divisions, System
Engineering and Space Systems, with major plants in four U.S.
cities. The largest plant and main corporate headquarters is
located in Northern California where the majority of
Government contract work is performed. Seventy-five percent
of total Government contract work performed by AEC is
considered subcontract work, the majority of which is
contracted with major companies such as Raytheon Company and
Grumman Aerospace Corporation.
AEC was originally incorporated under the laws of the
State of California, however, in 1977 it was reincorporated as
a Delaware corporation. The company stock is traded over-the-
counter and it is set up under what the Board of Directors
calls a "Corporate Partnership" (CorPar) . This allows the
company to enjoy the simplicity, flexibility, and efficiency
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of a partnership framework, while retaining the protective
features of the corporation. The CorPar is a simulated
partnership between shareholders and workers based on
corporate operation externally and partnership operation
internally.
Under this CorPar concept, gross company revenues are
divided into three categories: (1) basic business costs, (2)
preservation costs, and (3) profits. Basic business costs and
preservation costs have first and second priorities,
respectively, against gross revenues.
Basic business costs include all costs of material and
services, insurance, taxes, compensation for the employees and
compensation for the shareholders. Base compensation for each
employee is determined yearly as a result of the employee
evaluation process. Base compensation for each shareholder is
equivalent to a stated rate of interest applied to each
shareholder's share of the net worth of the company at the
beginning of the fiscal year. At the discretion of the Board
of Directors, the base compensation may be distributed by the
payment of cash dividends or by reinvestment in the company.
Preservation costs are the expenses of providing those
services which contribute to the well-being of the employees
and to the maintenance of adequate facilities and capital.
Included in preservation costs are provisions for seniority
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recognition, personnel maintenance and development, and
retirement.
Under CorPar, profits are determined at the end of each
fiscal year and allocated to the shareholder and employee
partners in proportion to the relative value of the
contribution of each to the combined endeavor. Sharable
profits are determined by subtracting the basic business and
preservation costs from gross revenues. Sharable profits, if
any, are divided annually between the employee and shareholder
members according to their respective capital values. The net
worth of the company and the total base salaries of the
employees are used to determine the relative capital values.
Each employee's total compensation is the sum of his base
compensation, his proportional share of preservation costs for
employee benefits and services and his portion of sharable
profits. It is interesting to note that any adverse cost
impact associated with a CAS non-compliance will directly
affect an employees' compensation. Each shareholder's total
compensation is the sum of the base compensation on his
investment, his proportional share of facility preservation
and his portion of sharable profits.
After joining AEC, an employee serves a two year
probationary period before becoming a regular member of the
company. After successful completion of the two year
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probationary period, the individual becomes a regular member
placed on the master rating list which ranks all members in
the order of their value to the company. Each regular member
takes part in the annual member evaluation program. A system
which serves as a kind of internal management control device.
Each member anonymously evaluates the work and attitude of all
in the department (including him or herself), then ranks each
member of the department (including him or herself) in what is
felt to be their order of value to the company. This data,
together with similar information from the department
supervisor, is given to the Member Evaluation Committee. This
committee, composed of company officials, executives and
supervisory personnel, fits the regular members from all
departments into a single list in the order of their relative
value to the company. The position on the master rating list
determines the relationship of one's basic wage to the wage of
others on the list.
Exhibit 3-1 displays a summary of the overall financial






















AEC is in solid financial condition in terms of cash flow,
debt management and profitability. Net earnings have
increased over 20 percent in the last three years as a result
of a corresponding increase in sales. Dividends have been
paid out at a fairly consistent rate of about 30 to 35 percent
of net earnings with the balance being reinvested in the
company for future growth.
The cost accounting system used by AEC is a standard cost
system. In a standard cost system, standard costs instead of
actual costs are part of the formal accounting recordkeeping
system. The use of standard costs in the accounting records
means that standard costs will be used for product costing and
can greatly reduce the complexity of product costing for
inventory valuation. Under standard costing, the value of
inventory is the number of units times the standard cost per
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unit. Only if the variance is "material" will the variance
have to be allocated. This reduces the clerical work needed
to value inventories because detailed records of the actual
cost per unit are not kept.
C. INITIAL FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE
On 30 June 1985, DCAA conducted an audit of proposed costs
that AEC had submitted in their bid for a subcontract to
recertify certain component parts. During the audit, the DCAA
auditor conducted a routine evaluation to determine if AEC was
in compliance with the CASB ' s rules, regulations and
standards. The results of the audit concluded that AEC was in
non-compliance with CAS 401 and CAS 402. This was formally
reported to the ACO by letter on 19 August 1985.
What the auditor found was that AEC had included in this
proposal a charge for "Other Costs" which amounted to an
arbitrary application of a 50 percent factor to total
manufacturing costs. The auditor found no basis for the
charge and was told that it was added to recover the
additional costs of handling and stocking of parts. Since no
historical records were maintained to justify this practice
the auditor concluded that AEC was in non-compliance with CAS
401, one of the consistency standards, which calls for
proposing, reporting and "recording costs on the same basis.
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Further, the costs involved were not separately identified and
were included in other areas of AEC ' s records for cost
recovery, constituting double recovery, and non-compliance
with CAS 402.
The auditor determined that this practice resulted in an
overstatement of proposed costs on the immediate proposal of
$170,424. This is illustrated in Exhibit 3-2, showing how the
50 percent factor was eliminated. Note that the exclusion of
other costs also impacted the G&A costs allocated on the basis
of total cost input. This total cost difference was $458.79
per unit. Also, the total price would likewise be affected.
The audit report recommended to the ACO that the
contractor be required to submit a cost impact proposal for
each and every CAS covered contract where it has employed the
same practice. In a letter dated 5 September 1985, the ACO
informed AEC of the findings of non-compliance with CAS 401
and 402, and requested that AEC review the findings and either
provide concurrence or reasons why existing practices were in
compliance. AEC's first response to the allegations of non-
compliance with CAS 401 and 402 was submitted to the ACO on 4
October 1985. The short response indicated that a more
thorough response refuting the allegations would be
forthcoming within 60 days. AEC was in the process of
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bringing in outside legal and accounting assistance to aid in
their defense. However, this initial response did attempt to
rExhibit 3-2
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make a case that the audit report was flawed by indicating
three points:
a. Practices used to quote the recertification component
prices are consistent with practices set forth in the
disclosure statement.
b. Practices used by AEC do not result in double recovery.
c. Changes in practices would result in increased costs to
the Government.
55
The main purpose of this initial response on the part of
AEC was to let the ACO know that it disagreed with the audit
findings and to give the ACO an opposing viewpoint to
consider. The initial points made by AEC were very general
and unsupported, but were included to try and put some doubt
in the mind of the ACO. Meanwhile, AEC would be able to bring
in experts to attempt to refute the allegations in detail.
D. DISPUTING THE CASE
On 9 December 1985, the ACO sent a letter to AEC
requesting the formal reply that had been promised within 60
days. On 19 February 1986, having not received a reply from
the company, the ACO again sent a letter requesting a formal
reply. This letter was sent directly to the Vice President,
indicating that a failure on the part of a contractor to
furnish requested data gives the ACO the unilateral right to
determine the cost impact of the non-compliance issued on
contracts/subcontracts and withhold up to 10 percent payment
on all CAS covered contracts/subcontracts. At the time, this
meant that up to seven million dollars could have been
withheld. AEC immediately requested in writing an extension
until 1 April 1986, which was granted.
AEC finally responded on 26 March 1986, again denying that
they were in non-compliance with CAS 401 and 402. Their first
56
point was that the costs in question, namely material/spare
parts handling costs, were all valid costs that the company
should be able to recover. Especially, they noted, when the
contract involves component parts, because these parts incur
extraordinarily large handling costs thus the needed 50
percent factor. Further, they point out that "this position
has been clearly supported by the Navy," and "this customer
recognized that such types of sales do indeed entail
additional amounts and types of costs, and recognizes that a
cost increment is appropriate." AEC felt that since the Navy,
who they did most of their DOD business with, had no problem
with this practice in the past, then why should it be a
problem now.
Addressing the allegation of non-compliance with CAS 402,
they stated:
We feel the auditor errs in suggesting that this
practice results in double recovery. This is because
the base on which the estimated costs and overheads
were generated includes consistent application of this
pricing practice. If, and only if, changes were being
made in the approach to pricing which included such an
increment, would the auditor be correct. Since this
is obviously not the case, we reject his allegation
and the attendant notion that the approach is
inconsistent with CAS 402.
Basically, AEC is saying that since they have been
consistently using this practice and have not changed in any
way their approach to pricing, then they comply with CAS 402.
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Their view was that the Standard called for consistent
application of pricing and that is what they were doing.
Addressing the allegation of non-compliance with CAS 401,
they stated:
It is agreed that costs are not recorded in the manner
interpreted by the auditor. However, it is felt that
the practice should not be construed as a CAS
violation. The audit report seems to suggest that
costs which are not physically booked or allocated to
cost objectives constitute CAS violations, and that
the only acceptable form of accounting system is one
which identifies and records all direct and allocated
costs to contract. Such logic seems to say that a
direct standard cost system cannot be considered in
compliance with CAS. We strongly disagree with the
audit report position regarding the CAS 401
allegation, since we feel that our current practices
should in no way be construed as being in violation of
this standard.
AEC's argument on the CAS 401 issue focuses on the fact
that they felt that the auditor found them in non-compliance
because of the cost accounting system that they were using.
The standard cost system that they use allows them to be less
detailed in their recordskeeping, and so they felt it to be
unnecessary to keep track of these material handling costs.
AEC's argument was that the Cost Accounting Standards didn't
prohibit the use of a standard cost system, so using one could
not put the company in non-compliance.
After reviewing these arguments, DCAA in their audit
report dated 19 May 1986, concluded that the contractor was
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still in non-compliance with both CAS 401 and 402. In regard
to the CAS 401 issue, the auditor makes clear that AEC ' s
accounting system is not at issue. The issue is the
development of the rate used to estimate the material handling
costs. The auditor contends that AEC has already made
modifications to its accounting system in order to use actual
costs for forward pricing purposes (i.e., development of
overhead rates prior to upcoming year in order to cost
proposals) instead of costs generated by the standard cost
system. There should be no difference in the development of
a pricing rate for material handling costs. Currently, AEC
does not maintain any type of records which support the rate
used in the proposal, therefore they are in non-compliance
with CAS 401.
In regard to the CAS 402 issue, the auditor agrees that
these costs may be necessary and recoverable, but the
consistent application of a pricing practice that results in
double recovery is not appropriate. The forward pricing rates
used to estimate overhead include all costs of the departments
that provide the services in question, including those
historical costs specifically related to the services in
question. Since all of these costs are recovered through the
forward pricing rates, any additional provision for the
recovery of these costs constitutes a double recovery.
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Therefore, when the subcontractor proposed an arbitrary factor
of 50 percent of base input costs it was in non-compliance
with CAS 402.
After reading the audit report, the ACO was now fully
confident of the Government's position and issued a formal
finding of non-compliance with both CAS 401 and 402 on 13
August 1986. This letter requested that AEC submit a cost
impact proposal within 60 days. AEC subsequently requested in
writing an extension until 15 December 1986, which was
granted.
According to AEC ' s Supervisor of Pricing and Cost
Analysis, it was at this point that AEC came to the
realization that they weren't going to be able to convince
either DCAA or the ACO that their cost accounting practices
were completely consistent with CAS 401 and 402. He further
indicated that their new strategy would now be to show that
while their cost accounting practices may not be consistent
with CAS, if they were forced to change practices in order to
recover these costs in a manner consistent with CAS, it would
end up costing the Government more in future contracts. AEC
was hoping that the ACO would then drop the issue.
From personal interview conducted with the company's
Supervisor of Pricing and Cost Analysis.
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The approach used by AEC was to calculate multiple
overhead rates for development effort, complete units and
component parts based on actual FY86 results. As opposed to
the company's actual practice which was to calculate a single
set of rates for all products it was selling (be it
development effort, complete units or component parts), and if
the product involved component parts to use the controversial
50 percent factor for "Other Costs" . The approach of
calculating a separate set of overhead rates would eliminate
the need for the 50 percent factor by allowing the company to
recover the costs through a revised overhead rate structure,
and would also be in compliance with CAS. AEC took the new
rates and applied them to all affected contracts occurring in
FY86. This caused a cost increase to the Government of
$2,476,750. AEC reported this to the ACO in a letter on 15
December 1986, which concluded by stating, "We suggest that a
price increase in CAS-covered contracts in general is indeed
detrimental to the interests of the Government, and that DCAA
recommendations concerning accounting changes should be
reconsidered.
"
Exhibit 3-3 illustrates how a change in the overhead rate
structure, as proposed by AEC, can result in such a large
increase in costs on Government contracts. AEC was awarded or
was in the process of negotiating a total of 55 Government
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contracts for 1986. Forty-five of these were for unit-type
acquisitions and 10 of these were for component-type
acquisitions. There were no contracts awarded or proposed for
development effort. Only the contracts for the component- type
acquisitions contained the 50 percent factor, so when the
revised overhead rates are applied to unit-type contracts, the
result is a price increase. This can be seen in Exhibit 3-3,
where one unit-type contract is displayed with both the old
rates and the new proposed rates. The difference in rates
results in a price increase of $41,838 on that one contract.
Also displayed is one component-type contract. The new
rates eliminate the 50 percent factor and apportion this
charge to labor overhead which would increase 155.65 percent.
However, the result of this is that the overall price would
decline by $18,042 on this contract. This is the typical
scenario for both types of contracts, however, because there
were 35 more unit-type contracts which are generally of a much
larger dollar value and involve larger quantities, the end
result is a price increase in Government contracts of almost
$2.5 million.
DCAA's subsequent audit, dated 20 May 1987, completely
disagreed with AEC's cost impact proposal. The auditor felt
that the AEC proposed rate restructuring went far beyond the
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rExhibit 3-3-
AEC DETERMINED COST IMPACT USING EXAMPLE CONTRACTS
AEC Revised 1986 Rate Structure AEC Actual
Item Unit Component Development 1986 Rates
Material OH 11.54% 11.54% N/A 11.54%
Labor OH 586.78% 700.94% 213.99% 545.29%
G & A 18.77% 28.94% 18.77% 22.21%
Profit 18.30% 18.30% 18.30% 18.30%
Unit-Type Contract Component-Type Contract
Actual Revised Actual Revised
Material $3,941 $3,941 $223 $223
Material OH 455 455 26 26
Labor 2,850 2,850 74 74
Labor OH 15.541 16_,723 404 519
Total Mfg Cost 22,787 23,969
Other Cost
Total Cost 22,787 23,969
G & A 5.061 4.499
Total Cost/G&A 27,848 28,468
Profit 5.096 5.210















Unit-Type Contract: $33,678 - $32,944 = $734 x 57units
$41,838 price increase to Government
Component-Type Contract: $1,576 - $1,285 = $291 x 62units
$18,042 price decrease to Government
Net Price Increase to Government: $23,796
two CAS issues at hand. In order to stick to the issues, AEC
basically had two choices if it wished to comply with CAS.
First, they could throw out the 50 percent factor completely
and forgo recovery of the costs. Second, they could develop
a material handling rate substantiated by actual recorded
data, which is called for- in CAS 418 on indirect costs.
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Using the same data that AEC used in its cost impact
proposal, the auditor developed a material handling rate and




Material Overhead 11.54% 11.54%
Labor Overhead 545.29% 551.72%
Other Direct Costs 50.00% 12.50%
G & A 22.21% 22.21%
Profit 18.30% 18.30%
The auditor then applied these rates to the 55 applicable
contracts for 1986 with the following results:
Cost Impact
Unit-Type Contracts (45) ($892,844)
Component-Type Contracts (10) $690.478
Net Increase ($202,366)
A net increase in cost to the Government of $202,366. The
auditor concurred with AEC that in FY86 if AEC had been in
compliance with CAS by developing a substantiated materials
handling rate, the result would have been an increase in cost
to the Government. However, the magnitude of that increase is
quite different, and in subsequent years with varying levels
of contract mix and current year rates those negative results
could change.
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After addressing the method proposed by AEC to comply with
CAS, the auditor then addressed the actual validity of the
cost impact. In accordance with the terms of FAR, cost impact
for CAS non-compliance should be computed by using the
difference between the contract price agreed to and the
contract price that would have been agreed to if the
contractor had complied with the CAS requirements. Since at
the time FY86 contracts were being negotiated there was no
substantiating documentation to support any material handling
rate, the contract price that would have been agreed to should
be the final negotiated price less the amount attributed to
the 50 percent arbitrary factor including the applicable
portion of G&A and profit. In FY86, AEC had been awarded one
negotiated contract that contained the 50 percent factor, for
a total cost impact of $23,698. This is the figure that the
auditor reported to the ACO as the actual cost impact
attributed to the non-compliance for FY86.
The ACO, on 3 March 1988, went back to AEC with a letter
requesting a revised cost impact proposal based on all FY86
and FY87 negotiated contracts containing the 50 percent
factor. It is worth noting that it took over 14 months for
the Government to respond to AEC's 15 December 1986 cost
impact proposal. This was due in part to a slow response by
DCAA, attributed to manpower shortages at the time, and a
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changeover of ACOs that resulted in this particular issue
being buried until the new ACO could get up to speed on all
aspects of the job.
E. RESOLUTION
According to AEC's Supervisor of Pricing and Cost
Analysis, at this point AEC recognized that they weren't going
to be able to convince the ACO or DCAA to drop the non-
compliance issues, and further, they were advised by outside
counsel that appealing this case to the ASBCA or other court
would not be worth the cost. They decided to go along with
2DCAA but attempt to minimize the damage as much as possible.
On 20 May 1988, AEC provided the ACO with the cost impact
for FY86 and FY87 affected contracts. In their response it
was noted that FY86 had been calculated by DCAA as $23,698 and
since no other FY86 contracts were applicable this was their
cost impact for FY86. For FY87, AEC provided a listing of all
Government proposals for component parts which were negotiated
and were originally proposed with "Other Costs". Of this
list, it was noted that only two proposals were negotiated
with "Other Costs" remaining. The total cost impact if "Other
Costs" were removed, including the applicable portion of G&A
2From personal interview conducted with the company s
Supervisor of Pricing and Cost Analysis.
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and profit, was proposed at $64,415. The total cost impact
proposed by AEC for FY86 and FY87 was $88,113.
On 9 January 1989, DCAA provided their audit of AEC '
s
latest cost impact proposal. This time the auditor wanted to
verify that AEC had included all applicable contracts in their
cost impact proposal. After a complete review of the ACO's
files, coupled with coordination and verification with the
cognizant buying offices, the auditor found five additional
contracts from FY87 and one additional contract from FY86 that
should have been included in the contractor's cost impact
proposal. The discrepancy was attributed by the auditor to
the fact that in those instances where the contract was
negotiated on a bottomline basis, the contractor's negotiation
files did not show any amounts for "Other Costs". However,
the data provided by representatives of the buying offices did
identify the amounts negotiated for "Other Costs".
The new cost impact as calculated by the auditor totaled
$303,237. This consisted of the actual cost impact of
$288,368 plus interest of $14,869. Interest was also omitted
from AEC ' s cost impact proposal but is required per FAR
52.230-3. The auditor also went further and recommended to
the ACO that AEC submit a cost impact for FY85 since the
practice of using the arbitrary 50 percent factor was started
in 1985.
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The ACO concurred with the auditor, and on 14 April 1989,
sent a letter to AEC informing them of the six contracts
discovered by the auditor. In addition, the ACO requested a
complete cost impact including FY85 affected contracts be
submitted within 30 days. AEC subsequently requested and was
granted an extension until 9 June 1989.
On 7 June 1989, AEC responded in complete agreement with
DCAA. This time they provided a copy of all applicable
contracts from FY85, FY86 and FY87 and proposed a cost impact
(less interest) of $300,898. Which, they pointed out,
exceeded the DCAA recommendation (less interest) of $288,368.
Their proposal also included the DCAA recommendation for
interest of $14,869. This made AEC ' s total cost impact
proposal $315,767.
In reality, AEC did not and still does not agree with the
inclusion of many of the contracts in the cost impact
proposal. However, to preclude DCAA from digging even deeper
into their files, AEC felt it was a good time to cut their
3losses and get the issue resolved.
The final DCAA audit, submitted to the ACO on 15 November
1989, questioned only one element of AEC ' s cost impact. The
auditor recalculated the amount of interest through 31 October
3From personal interview with the company s Supervisor of
Pricing and Cost Analysis.
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1989, and came up with an adjusted interest charge of $27,160.
The difference being an additional $12,291, raising the total
cost impact to $328,058. The auditor concluded however, that
AEC's cost impact proposal was acceptable for negotiating a
resolution to the non-compliance with CAS 401 and 402.
Negotiations between the Government and AEC were conducted
on 2 May 1990. The Government was represented by the ACO and
a DCAA auditor. AEC was represented by the Supervisor, Cost
Analysis and Government Accounting, and the Manager of
Government Accounting. During the negotiations the following
points were clarified and agreed on:
a. It was confirmed by AEC that the questionable
practice of using the unsubstantiated 50 percent
factor for "Other Costs" was corrected in October
1987.
b. AEC confirmed that the listing of contracts used to
compute the cost impact was complete. The ACO also
requested, and AEC agreed, to certify that the listing
is complete to the best of their knowledge, and if
other affected contracts were discovered in the
future, AEC would agree to re-open negotiations and
reimburse the Government for overcharges at that time.
c. It was agreed that an offset of other open
contracts would be the vehicle for recovery, and a
Letter of Agreement would be executed which would
include the certification discussed in paragraph b
above
.
d. AEC's proposal for the overcharge of $300,898 was
accepted.
e. The interest charge agreed on totaled $46,722
computed as follows:
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(1) The midpoint of contract shipments over the
life of each affected contract would be used as
the starting point for interest calculations and
interest would accrue up to the time the
adjustment is affected, 1 June 1990.
(2) Prior to August 1986, the Cost Accounting
Standards clause stated that the interest rate
would be the treasury rate or seven percent,
whichever was less. FAC 84-21 dated 29 August
1986, eliminated the seven percent cap on
interest. During the negotiations it was agreed
that for all 1985 and 1986 contracts, seven
percent would be used (the actual treasury rate
was higher for these years), and for all 1987
contracts, the actual treasury rate would be used.
(3) The compound interest method would be used,
computed on the auditor developed figure for cost
impact of $288,368.
When negotiations were completed, the total cost impact
agreed to by both parties was $347,620
F . SUMMARY
Following the exact letter of CAS 401, CAS 402 and other
pertinent regulations, the Government had a valid case for the
prosecution of non-compliance and eventual recovery of costs.
AEC had in fact not maintained historical records to
substantiate the 50 percent factor used to estimate "Other
Costs", and they were in fact recovering some of these costs
through the existing overhead structure. This would no doubt
lead one to the logical conclusion that they were in non-
compliance with both CAS 401 and 402. AEC ' s attempts to
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mitigate the issues were unsuccessful in the face of
persistent and highly capable DCAA auditors. Eventually, even
outside accounting and legal counsel obtained by AEC to aid in
their defense succumbed to the realization that the practice
was non-compliant, and pursuing their line of argument further
would be fruitless.
AEC argued that there were additional material handling
costs associated with the sale of component parts (receiving,
stocking, issuing, obsolescence), above that which was
normally recovered for other types of sales. Further, they
argued that their accounting system (a standard cost system)
was set up to preclude detailed recordskeeping, which was less
costly for them and fit in well with their predominant
commercial business. It was also shown by the DCAA auditor
that by applying 1986 actual data, the development of a
material handling rate, which would be in compliance with CAS,
would result in an overall cost increase to the Government.
This shows two things about AEC and the issues involved
here. First, that they were correct in asserting that there
were additional recoverable costs associated with the handling
of materiel. Second, that they were not attempting to defraud
the Government in any way, but instead were using judgement
instead of more detailed and substantiated accounting data to
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estimate valid costs. In 1986, the result of this practice
was detrimental to themselves.
There are two issues that the Government must deal with in
any CAS case. The first is seeing to it that the accounting
practice is changed to conform with CAS, and the second is the
cost impact/recovery. Both are important, however, in the
absence of fraud the primary emphasis in implementing CAS
should be to ensure that the accounting practice is changed to
conform with CAS.
In the case of AEC, the non-conforming accounting practice
was discovered in June 1985, but wasn't corrected until
October 1987. Throughout this time, AEC was engaged in
negotiating contracts using the non-conforming accounting
practice, with the ACO and DCAA auditors fully aware of this.
From the very beginning, the emphasis was placed on cost
impact and cost recovery instead of correcting the practice.
Nowhere in any of the DCAA audit reports submitted over the
five years of this case did the auditors ever discuss actions
that the company was taking or not taking to correct the
accounting practice. The ACO and the auditor were concerned
only with the validity of the cost impact proposal.
AEC dragged their feet in resolving the issue because they
felt justified in collecting the additional costs associated
with material handling, and wanted to minimize the negative
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cost impact they knew would occur as a result of these CAS
non-compliances. From AEC's viewpoint, correcting the
accounting practice immediately would have been an admission
of guilt and would have made the mitigation of cost impact
that much more difficult.
Once the Government can satisfy itself that the actual
cost impact is not detrimental to the Government, then the
focus should be on correcting the accounting practice in order
to provide uniformity and consistency for future contracts.
It was clearly shown using 1986 data that the material
handling costs associated with contracts for component parts
were above that normally recovered through the regular
overhead accounts. Further, that these costs were valid
recoverable costs and if documented properly could be
recovered in full. The actual cost impact would have been
additional costs to the Government if these costs had been
documented properly. This was pointed out by AEC (though
inflated) and verified by the DCAA auditor.
Instead of examining the validity of the costs and the
actual historical cost impact, the Government looks only at
what would have been negotiated if the costs associated with
the non-conforming practice had been excluded completely.
More times than not this will result in a negative cost impact
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to the company, which will always put the company on the
defensive and end up dragging out the resolution for years.
In this case, if the Government had concentrated its
efforts on ensuring correction of the accounting practice
instead of the recovery of costs, that in actuality were
valid, then much time, effort and money could have been saved
by both parties. In addition and probably more importantly,
the spirit of CAS, to achieve uniformity and consistency in
cost accounting practices could have been realized sooner.
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IV. CASE 2: COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD 405
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the second Cost
Accounting Standard non-compliance case involving American
Electronics Corporation (AEC). Background on the company was
presented in Chapter III, and will not be repeated here. This
case involves Cost Accounting Standard 405, Accounting For
Unallowable Costs. The facts of the case will be presented in
detail from the time the initial finding was first reported
through to the final negotiation and settlement. This will
then be followed by a summary and analysis of the issues in
this case.
B. INITIAL FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE
On 27 February 1987, DCAA conducted an audit of proposed
costs that AEC had submitted in their bid for a subcontract.
The ensuing audit report concluded that in the area of
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards, AEC was in non-
compliance with CAS 405. This was formally reported to the
ACO by letter dated 27 April 1987.
The auditor had discovered that AEC was not excluding
unallowable costs for its on-site cafeteria. The cafeteria
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was not generating sufficient revenues to cover its operating
costs. Its loss from operation was subsidized by the company.
Per FAR Subpart 31 . 205-13 (b) , contractors' food service
operations should be operated with the express intention of
breaking even. This means that the operation of the cafeteria
at AEC must pay for itself, and any loss incurred cannot be
charged against Government contracts.
The estimated cost impact reported by the auditor was
$195,000, calculated as follows:
Total Direct Labor 1987 $8,883,000
Estimated Direct Labor %
on Govt Contracts 30%
Estimated Direct Labor $
on Govt Contracts $2,664,000
% of Overhead Rate Related
to Cafeteria Excess Costs 73%
Cost Impact $195,000
Annual total direct labor dollars for AEC were about
$8,883,000. At the time of this finding it was estimated that
about 30 percent of AEC's business was with the Government, so
total direct labor dollars attributed to Government contracts
was $2,664,000. AEC had included $646,000 of these
unallowable cafeteria expenses as part of its total overhead
pool of $51,607,000, which has an estimated impact of about
7.3 percent of the proposed 581 percent rate ($51.607M divided
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by $8.883M direct labor costs). This makes the anticipated
cost impact about $195,000.
In a letter dated 14 May 1987, the ACO informed AEC of the
finding of non-compliance with CAS 405. The ACO requested
that within 30 days AEC provide concurrence/non-concurrence
with the initial finding and either submit a cost impact
proposal or reasons why existing practices should be
considered to be in compliance.
AEC responded by letter on 23 June 1987, refuting the
allegations of non-compliance. They did not deny charging the
cafeteria expenses to Government contracts, but rather tried
to justify the inclusion of these costs as necessary to the
operation of the business. The reply stated:
It is our contention that AEC cafeteria expenses are
reasonable and should be considered allowable based on the
unusual circumstances that exist. For instance, AEC base
pay rates are below the industry standard. Because of
lower base pay rates, the company offers an attractive
fringe benefits program to compete in today's labor market
for qualified individuals. The resulting benefit to AEC
and, ultimately, the Government are lower direct labor
costs
.
Based on costs to run the cafeteria, we estimated that we
spend about $500 per member to operate the AEC cafeteria.
If AEC discontinued the cafeteria benefit, the cost to
members to go outside for lunch would be over $1,000 per
member, based on average meal prices for comparable meals
outside the company. However, the low-cost cafeteria
program, which we consider as a fringe benefit, is
appealing because it translates into a benefit to the
members that is worth more than the cost itself. This is
evidenced by our continued subsidy to the members despite
new withholding tax requirements. If AEC did not offer
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this type of benefit, the base wages would be adjusted to
compensate for this loss in benefits.
Another benefit of the in-house cafeteria is that it
allows the company flexibility in scheduling sufficient
time for lunch breaks of 30 minutes instead of one hour.
The results of this scheduling are two-fold:
(1) Less member tardiness, and
(2) Increased daily productivity per member.
AEC also believes that offering well-balanced nutritious
meals has resulted in better health and increased morale
of its members, leading to better sustained performance.
AEC recommends that the cafeteria costs should remain in
the FY87 forward pricing rates, and should be subject to
negotiations on an individual contract basis.
AEC's Supervisor of Pricing and Cost Analysis, indicated
that AEC felt very strongly about their position on this
issue. The main reason was the possible affect on pricing for
commercial contracts. AEC knew that if the Government
disallowed these costs, then AEC's commercial customers who
paid close attention to Government costing policies, would
strongly object to being charged for these cafeteria costs.
If AEC could not recoup these costs, then the only way to
eliminate the problem would be to raise prices in the
cafeteria. AEC did pay its employees below industry standard,
but made up for it with an above average benefits package,
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including the cafeteria. This would all but eliminate one
4portion of that benefit package.
The ensuing DCAA audit, dated 14 August 1987, was
unfavorable for AEC. The auditor did not comment on AEC ' s
argument, but rather simply stated that after researching the
FAR and other Government regulations, nothing could be found
that would make these costs allowable.
The ACO concurred with the DCAA audit and issued a
determination of non-compliance with CAS 405 to AEC on 2 March
1988. The ACO gave AEC 30 days to submit a cost impact
statement. AEC requested in writing an extension until 10
July 1988, which was granted.
C. DISPUTING THE CASE
AEC responded on 17 June 1988, but did not submit a cost
impact statement. Instead, they attempted to refute the
determination of non-compliance made by the ACO, and requested
reconsideration based on the following information:
1. The cafeteria costs that DCAA has claimed to be
unallowable are not explicitly stated in the cost principles
(FAR Part 31) as unallowable costs.
2. DCAA has reviewed our forward pricing rates on an annual
basis and have never questioned our cafeteria costs
previously.
4From personal interview conducted with the company s
Supervisor of Pricing and Cost Analysis.
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3. As stated in our 23 June 1987 letter, unrecovered
cafeteria costs are part of the benefit package offered to
our employees. Since January 1987, the employees who have
utilized our cafeteria have paid federal and state income
taxes on the unrecovered portion of their meals. The system
used to tax members for benefits received from the cafeteria
was established to meet requirements of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984. All direct costs, as defined by IRS guidelines,
are recovered from cafeteria receipts. The DCAA auditor
stated in recent telephone conversations that he was unaware
of this change during his review of our FY87 rates, and
subsequent evaluation of our reply to initial findings of
non-compliance
.
DCAA reviewed this latest attempt by AEC to refute the
determination of non-compliance, and on 12 September 1988,
released an audit report addressing each of the points raised
by AEC. The audit report also included an estimated cost
impact for all the years involved.
In regard to their first point, in which AEC asserted that
cafeteria costs are not explicitly unallowable under the cost
principles, DCAA's response was:
CAS 405.40(a) states that costs expressly unallowable
shall be identified and excluded from any billing, claim
or proposal applicable to a Government contract.
Unallowable costs are defined as any costs which under the
provisions of any pertinent law, regulation, or contract,
cannot be included in prices, cost reimbursements or
settlements under a Government contract to which it is
allocable.
The losses from the cafeteria are unallowable because it
was not the contractor's objective to operate the
cafeteria on a break-even basis as required by FAR 31.205-
13(b). This regulation states that losses sustained
because food services are furnished at prices which are
below a break-even basis are unallowable.
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In regard to their second point, in which AEC asserted
that DCAA has never questioned cafeteria costs previously,
DCAA's response was:
Although these costs were not previously questioned, this
does not relieve the contractor of the requirement to
comply with the provisions of CAS 405.40(a), which states
in part that "unallowable costs shall be identified and
excluded from claims, billings or proposals applicable to
Government contracts." Thus, since the contractor has the
responsibility to identify and exclude unallowable costs,
the Government is not precluded from questioning such
costs simply because these costs were not questioned in
prior audits.
In regard to their third point, in which AEC asserted that
effective 1 January 1987, employees have paid Federal and
state income taxes on the unrecovered portion of their meals,
DCAA's response was:
Under the current policy of requiring employees to report
as income the subsidized portion of the meals, the
contractor is in essence operating the cafeteria on a
break- even basis as required by FAR 31.205-13. Thus, the
estimated cost impact is based on losses incurred prior to
the 1 January 1987 change.
The bottom line of all of this, as far as the Government
is concerned, is that AEC is compliant with CAS 405 after 1
January 1987. However, prior to that, AEC was not in
compliance with CAS 405 and must reimburse the Government in
the amount of the cost impact as a result of the non-
compliance .
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The DCAA auditor determined that the inclusive time period
of the cost impact should be FY85, FY86 and the first three
months of FY87. Using actual data from this period of time,
and employing the same methodology previously used, the
auditor estimated the cost impact to be $564,523 calculated as
shown in Exhibit 4-1. The basis for this calculation is an
estimate of the direct labor used on Government contracts
considering the percentage of Government business conducted by
AEC. This will be a rough estimate at best, but it does give
the ACO some idea of the amount in question.
rExhibit 4-1-
DCAA ESTIMATED COST IMPACT (12 SEPTEMBER 1988)
FY87
1st 3 Mths FY86 FY85
Total Direct Labor Cost $2,220,750 $9,367,000 $6,890,000
% of Government Sales
Estimated Direct Labor
on Govt Contracts











Total Cost Impact ( FY87 , FY86 , FY85 ) - $564,523
The ACO concurred with DCAA's position, and on 8 December
1988, sent a letter to AEC delineating the Government's
position and requested a cost impact statement for FY85
through the first quarter of FY87 be submitted within 30 days.
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AEC requested in writing an extension until 3 February 1989,
which was granted.
AEC submitted their first cost impact statement on 7
February 1989. The total amount proposed by AEC as the cost
impact for non-compliance with CAS 405 was $3,388.25,
obviously well below the estimates calculated by DCAA. In
order to arrive at this figure, AEC first calculated what they
thought were the applicable amount of cafeteria costs for the
three fiscal years involved. Then, they removed these costs
from the labor overhead pool and G&A cost input base to arrive
at revised rates for labor overhead and G&A. The combined
affect was to lower the labor overhead rate and offset this
with an increase in the G&A rate. The resulting change in
rates looked like this:
Labor Overhead Rates
FY85 FY86 FY87
Before 447.4% 421.3% 581.0%
Adjusted 442.3% 417.2% 576.8%
G&A Rates
_FY85_ _FY86_ FY87
Before 28.1% 24.4% 23.3%
Adjusted 28.2% 24.6% 23.4%
The increase in the G&A rate was not as much as the
decrease in the labor overhead rate, however, when applied to
the total cost input this amount would serve to sufficiently
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offset the decrease in labor overhead. The result, as planned
by AEC, would be minimal cost impact.
The final steps in AEC ' s cost impact methodology were the
identification of applicable contracts, and the determination
of the effects of the adjusted rates. In order to choose the
contracts to include, AEC stated in their letter:
We reviewed for cost impact all proposals and negotiations
during this time frame that resulted in CAS covered
contracts. In those situations where "bottom line
negotiations" took place, our records show that slight
changes from rate adjustments (in most cases less than one
percent) were more than offset by a substantial AEC price
concession in the negotiated contract; therefore, we did
not consider any further reductions for CAS 405 impact.
However, you will note that we have adjusted several
contracts for impact plus profit where this level of
negotiation activity did not occur.
AEC identified four contracts from FY86, and no contracts
from either FY85 or FY87 for cost impact purposes. The total
cost impact was calculated as shown in Exhibit 4-2.
On 2 May 1989, DCAA submitted its audit report on AEC '
s
cost impact proposal. The auditor's conclusion was that it
was completely inadequate. The reasons as stated in the audit
report were:
1. The contractor did not include all CAS covered contracts
in effect during the applicable period.
2. The contractor excluded those contracts which were
negotiated on a "bottom" line" basis.
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rExhibit 4-2
AEC COST IMPACT PROPOSAL (7 FEBRUARY 1989)




















3. Certain marginal food services costs were eliminated from
the computations.
4. The computed unallowable costs were also removed from the
G&A base by the contractor which is in violation of FAR
31.203(c). This causes the G&A base to be understated and
the G<&A rate to be overstated.
The auditor was unable to obtain a complete list of CAS
covered contracts and subcontracts for the affected period of
time from either the contractor or the ACO. Neither keeps an
adequate ready access data base of this information. As a
result, the auditor again used an estimate of AEC's percentage
of Government business to compute another more detailed cost
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impact of the CAS 405 non-compliance. This time the auditor's
overall estimated cost impact totaled $1,355,700, as shown in
Exhibit 4-3.
The calculations in this estimate are much more detailed
than the previous DCAA estimates, and include the effects on
G&A and profit, and an interest charge. The reason for this
estimate, as stated in the audit report, was to facilitate the
ACO in negotiating a reasonable settlement. However, this
latest estimate is well above the previous DCAA estimates and
is so far above the AEC proposal that negotiation at this
point would be impossible. After talking with both DCAA and
AEC personnel, the researcher believes that the underlying
reason for DCAA's latest estimate was to motivate the
contractor to submit a realistic cost impact proposal which
could be used as a basis for negotiation.
D. RESOLUTION
After the DCAA audit report was issued, AEC put together
a list of CAS covered contracts and subcontracts which was
sent to the ACO. Subsequently, on 11 July 1989, the ACO sent
a letter to AEC requesting a revised Cost Impact Statement
incorporating all the CAS covered contracts and subcontracts,
and addressing all the issues raised in the DCAA audit report.
A response was requested within 30 days.
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•Exhibit 4-3-



























































































Total Cost Impact (FY85, FY86, FY87) - $1,355,700
Note 1. Figures obtained by auditor from AEC ' s records.
Note 2. Cafeteria expense represents the excess of costs
over revenues for FY83 , FY84 and FY85. increased by the
projected growth of expenses (28.1%, 29.4%, 22.3%) as
shown in AEC's records. In their proposal, AEC did not
escalate cafeteria expenses to FY85, FY86 and FY87
dollars. Instead, they used the historical cost from
FY83, FY84 and FY85
.
Note 3. Rates are as shown in AEC's cost impact proposal
Note 4. Estimated 40% of sales with Government.
Note 5. Amount represents application of the proposed
rates of 28.1%, 24.4% and 23.3% respectively.
Note 6. Profit based on 18.3% rate proposed by AEC.
Note 7. Interest amounts are based on 28%, 21% and 14%
factors for the respective years. These percentages are
based on an annual rate of 7% for four, three and two
years respectively.
Note 8. Based on non-compliance for 3 months in FY87
.
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According to AEC's Supervisor of Pricing and Cost
Analysis, as a result of not wanting to be on the long end of
a $1.3M judgement
,
AEC arranged a meeting with DCAA to reach
an agreement on how exactly the cost impact statement should
5be developed . An agreement was reached, and on 31 August
1989, AEC submitted a revised cost impact statement.
The methodology agreed to and employed by AEC was to
calculate an adjusted labor overhead rate based on the
exclusion of the unallowable cafeteria costs, and then apply
this to the CAS covered contracts and subcontracts identified
by AEC for FY85 through the first quarter of FY87 . The
calculations by AEC to arrive at the adjusted labor overhead
rates are presented in Exhibit 4-4. The calculations to
determine the bottom line cost impact for FY85 prime
contracts, FY86 prime contracts and FY85-FY86 subcontracts is
presented in Exhibits 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7 respectively.
According to AEC's records, there were no contracts or
subcontracts negotiated or awarded during the first quarter of
FY87. The total cost impact proposed by AEC was $289,628.
In their letter to the ACO, AEC identified two problems
which arose during the calculation of the cost impact
proposal. The first was the lack of supporting cost breakdown
5From personal interview conducted with the company s
Supervisor of Pricing and Cost Analysis.
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documentation for contracts awarded below the cost or pricing
data threshold. In regard to this, AEC proposed:
r-Exhibit 4-4




















Adjusted Overhead Rate 439.5%








It was discovered that certain contracts were awarded
without SF1411 supporting documentation, as certified cost
or pricing data was not required if the proposed value was
less than $500,000 and submitted before 1 April 1985.
Upon thorough review of our files, cost breakdowns were
not found. However, in order to determine a fair offer of
impact on these CAS-covered contracts as well, we
determined the average percentage of contract price
reduction on those with SF1411 data on file and assessed
this percentage to the total value of all other contracts.
The second problem encountered by AEC was the
determination of the payment period to calculate interest
owed. In regard to this, AEC proposed:
For the interest calculations, rather than review
voluminous invoice historical files to determine payment
period, we determined the midpoint of contract delivery
schedules and compounded interest from this date to August
1989. Hopefully, you will concur with our assumption that
this represents a reason-able payment period average, given





COST IMPACT FOR CAS-COVERED PRIME CONTRACTS PLACED FY 1985
Contract ttl Contract #2 Contract #3
Negotiated Price (A) $1,053,000 $2,423,600 $240,604
Negotiated Labor Base (B) 95,328 249,249 3,562
Overhead Adjustment
From Exhibit 4-4 (C) 7.9°/ 6.1°/ 6.1%
Overhead Recovery (D=B*C) 7,531 15,204 217
G & A Rate (E) 28.1% 24.4% 24.4%
G & A Recovery (F=D*E) 2.116 3.710 53
Subtotal (G=D+F) 9,647 18,914 270
Negotiated Profit % (H) 16.1% 15.3% 15.0%
Profit Recovery (I=H*G) 1.553 2,894 41
Subtotal (J=G+I) 11,200 21,808 311
Interest (K) 2^521 4.908 70
Net Cost Impact (L=J+K) $13,721 $26,716 $381




Proposed Percent Reduction 1 . 0%
Net Cost Impact $11,032
Net Cost Impact Contract #1 13,721
Net Cost Impact Contract #2 26,716
Net Cost Impact Contract #3 381
Total Impact Proposed For
FY 1985 Prime Contracts: $51,850
The final DCAA audit report was submitted on 23 February
1990. In his report, the auditor concluded that the data
presented by AEC in their latest proposal were acceptable for
negotiating cost impact, however there were three exceptions
noted by the auditor. First, was the universe of contracts
used to determine the cost impact. The audit report stated
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Exhibit 4-6 —
COST IMPACT FOR CAS-COVERED PRIME CONTRACTS PLACED FY 1986
Contract ttl Contract #2 Contract #3
Negotiated Price (A) $258,375 $916,050 $3,770,336
Negotiated Labor Base (B) 22,105
Overhead Adjustment
From Exhibit 4-4 (C) 6. 1%
Overhead Recovery (D=B*C) 1,348
G <& A Rate (E) 24.4%
G & A Recovery (F=D*E) 329
Subtotal (G=D+F) 1,677
Negotiated Profit % (H) 13.1%
Profit Recovery (I=H*G) 220
Subtotal (J=G+I) 1,897
Interest (K) 273
Net Cost Impact (L=J+K) $2,170























































that, "the results of audit are qualified as to the
completeness and accuracy of the universe of CAS covered
contracts since we do not have a Government maintained
universe of CAS covered contracts, and accordingly we cannot





COST IMPACT FOR CAS-COVERED SUBCONTRACTS PLACED FY 1985-86
Cont #1 Cont #2 Cont #3 Cont #4
Negotiated Price (A) $7,809.0 $13,830.6 $2,505.6 $2,981.9
Negotiated Labor
Base (B) 553,069 1,045,583 231,552 230,975
Overhead Adjustment
From Exhibit 4-4 (C) 6.1^
Overhead Recovery
6_.1% 6.1% 6.1°/
(D=B*C) 33,737 63,781 14,125 14,089
G & A Rate (E) 24.4% 24.4% 24.4% 24.4%
G & A Recovery (F=D*E) 8.232 15.562 3.446 3.438
Subtotal (G=D+F) 41,969 79,343 17,571 17,527
Negotiated Profit % (H) 11.3% 12.0% 11.4% 17.0%
Profit Recovery (I=H*G) 4,743 9,521 2,003 2,980
Subtotal (J=G+I) 46,712 88,864 19,574 20,507
Interest (K) 6.769 12.876 2.836 2,971
Net Cost Impact
(L=J+K) $53,481 $101,740 $22,410 $23,478
Net Cost Impact Contract #1 $ 53,481
Net Cost Impact Contract #2 101,740
Net Cost Impact Contract #3 22,410
Net Cost Impact Contract #4 23_,478
Total Impact Proposed For
FY 1985-86 Subcontracts: $201,109
without SF1411.Note: There were zero contracts awarded
The second exception that the auditor took was with the
exclusion of both current and deferred profit sharing costs
from the break-even analysis. The auditor felt that these
costs were generated by the cafeteria department and should be
treated exactly the same as other salaries and wages. They
should have been included as an unallowable portion of
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cafeteria costs when calculating an adjusted labor overhead
rate
.
The third exception that the auditor took with AEC ' s cost
impact proposal was the seven percent per annum interest rate
used. The interest rate should have been the Treasury rate in
affect at the time, which was above seven percent.
Using the same basic methodology as AEC, the auditor
recomputed the cost impact taking into consideration his
exceptions concerning the profit sharing costs and the
interest rate. The auditor accepted the list of contracts
provided by AEC as complete. The auditor's cost impact
totaled $390,054 as compared to the AEC total of $289,628,
however, with the auditor's recommendation, the ACO decided to
negotiate the difference.
Negotiations between the Government and AEC were conducted
on 7 May 1990. The Government was represented by the ACO and
a DCAA auditor. AEC was represented by the Supervisor of
Pricing and Cost Analysis, and the Supervisor of Government
Accounting. During the negotiations the following points were
clarified/agreed on:
1. AEC confirmed that the practice of charging cafeteria
costs below the break-even point was corrected 1 January
1987.
2. AEC confirmed that "the listing of contracts used to
compute the cost impact was complete. The ACO also
requested and AEC agreed to certify that the listing is
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complete to the best of their knowledge, and if other
affected contracts were discovered in the future, AEC would
agree to re-open negotiations and reimburse the Government
for overcharges at that time.
3. It was agreed that an offset of other open contracts
would be the vehicle for recovery, and a Letter of Agreement
would be executed which would include the certification
discussed above.
4. The interest charge agreed on totaled $66,772, computed
as follows:
a. The midpoint of contract shipments over the life of
each affected contract would be used as the starting
point for interest calculations and interest would accrue
up to the time the adjustment is affected, 1 June 1990.
b. Prior to August 1986, the Cost Accounting Standards
clause stated that the interest rate would be the
Treasury rate or seven percent, whichever was less. FAC
84-21 dated 29 August 1986, eliminated the seven percent
cap on interest. During the negotiations it was agreed
that for all 1985 and 1986 contracts, seven percent would
be used (the actual Treasury rate was one to one and a
half percent higher for these years), and for all 1987
contracts, the actual Treasury rate would be used.
5. The final point to clarify was the profit sharing costs.
It was noted by AEC that depreciation and property tax had
been excluded from the cafeteria costs because these costs
would exist even if there were no cafeteria. AEC ' s position
was that the profit sharing costs should be excluded on the
same basis because if the profit sharing had not gone to
cafeteria workers, it would have gone to others in the
company. It was the auditor's position on the other hand
that profit sharing is a benefit that amounts to
approximately 35 percent of each worker's compensation, and
should be considered the same as salary costs. The final
cost impact negotiated (excluding interest) was $304,228. It
represented a compromise between AEC ' s initial position
which completely excluded the profit sharing costs, and the
DCAA audit report which included all profit sharing costs
for cafeteria workers.
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When negotiations were completed, the total cost impact
agreed to by both parties was $371,000, summarized as follows:
Negotiated Cost Impact $304,228
Interest 66. 772
Total Cost Impact $371,000
E . SUMMARY
CAS 405 does not actually identify costs which are
unallowable on Government contracts. CAS 405 deals with the
accounting and separate identification of allowable vs
unallowable costs. It requires that any expressly unallowable
cost must be identified and excluded from any billing, claim,
or proposal applicable to a Government contract. There is no
doubt that in this case the cafeteria costs in question were
unallowable. The Cost Principles (FAR Subpart 31 . 205-13 (b)
)
specifically state that costs associated with a food service
operation which is not operated with the intent of breaking
even are unallowable. AEC's cafeteria was obviously being
operated with the intention that the company would subsidize
the meal cost for employees, a fact that AEC openly admitted
to in the beginning.
AEC knew from the outset that according to the letter of
the law these cafeteria costs were unallowable and should have
been excluded from all CAS* covered contracts and subcontracts.
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However, that did not stop them from putting up a defense and
attempting to mitigate the cost impact as much as possible.
It took over three years for the two sides to agree on a fair
settlement.
AEC's first response to the Government regarding the
allegations consisted entirely of an attempt to reason with
the ACO. AEC tried to convince the ACO that since the company
pays its employees less than standard wages and makes up for
it with above average benefits, such as the cafeteria, that
these costs should be considered additional wages. The letter
went on to explain in detail the multitude of benefits,
including increased productivity and morale, that accrue to
the company and its customers (i.e., the Government) as a
result of operating the cafeteria in this manner.
Additionally, AEC was very concerned how its commercial
customers would react to the Government's decision to disallow
these costs.
It could be argued that there is some validity to this
defense on the part of AEC. They do pay their employees less
than standard industry wages and make up for it with a very
attractive package of benefits. It definitely penalizes the
company and its employees if these costs cannot be recouped
through normal operations. However rational the argument may
be, the bottom line for DCAA and thus for the ACO is that the
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costs are explicitly unallowable and subject to reimbursement
by the company. This is the position that they would
maintain.
AEC's second response to the allegations was similarly
fruitless, but did result in the Government acknowledging that
the non-compliant practice was corrected as of 1 January 1987.
However, each time DCAA audited one of AEC's rebuttals, the
auditor found a way to increase the estimated cost impact. By
the time AEC finally decided that their only choice would be
to try and mitigate the cost impact and they submitted their
first cost impact statement, the ensuing audit resulted in a
difference of $1,352,300 between AEC and the Government. It
was certainly obvious that AEC had understated significantly
the cost impact, and DCAA presented the absolute worst
scenario for AEC. This did motivate AEC to come up with an
acceptable list of affected contracts and subcontracts, and
submit a more realistic cost impact statement. From this, the
two sides were able to negotiate a settlement.
While the interpretation of CAS 405 in this case was
fairly easy, implementation turned out to be extremely
difficult and time consuming. Issues concerning which
contracts and subcontracts to include, and which costs
involved in the operation of the cafeteria had to be resolved
before an agreement could be reached. With each side trying
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to game the other, this only made for a more difficult
resolution.
Earlier face to face discussions between the parties could
have saved much time and energy on both sides, and possibly
resulted in a much sooner resolution. However, this is not
always in the best interests of the company, who is trying to
prevent the repayment of any costs to the Government by
stretching out to the maximum extent possible the
implementation of the regulation.
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V . CASE 3: COST ACCOUNTING STANDARD 418
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the third Cost
Accounting Standard non-compliance case involving American
Electronics Corporation (AEC). This case involves Cost
Accounting Standard 418, Allocation of Direct and Indirect
Costs. The facts of the case will be presented in detail from
the time the initial finding was first reported until the
company became compliant with CAS 418. This will then be
followed by a summary and analysis of the issues in this case.
B. INITIAL FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE
On 22 December 1981, DCAA conducted an audit of proposed
costs that AEC had submitted in their bid for a subcontract.
During the audit the DCAA auditor conducted a routine
evaluation to determine if AEC was in compliance with the
CASB's rules, regulations and standards. The results of the
audit concluded that AEC was in potential non-compliance with
CAS 418. Further, that AEC had a CAS 418 applicability date
of 1 January 1982. This was formally reported to the ACO by
letter on 29 March 1982. According to the auditor's findings,
by the time this report was submitted the company was actually
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in non-compliance. Their actual applicability date was later
determined to be 1 October 1982, as will be discussed in
detail later in the case.
The auditor found that AEC's stated accounting practice
was to include all engineering costs in the G&A expense pool.
Further, that some of AEC's engineering activities, such as
technical and non- supervisory labor, were performed directly
for cost objectives and could be identified as such in the
records. This is contrary to CAS 418 which requires that all
costs identifiable to a specific objective be charged directly
to that objective, and costs not directly assignable be
accumulated in homogeneous cost pools.
The auditor concluded that in order for AEC to comply with
CAS 418, they must restructure their overhead rates by
adjusting the G&A expense rate and adding a rate for indirect
engineering expense. The reason for this change is that the
indirect engineering costs were material in amount, and so in
accordance with CAS 418 should be grouped in a separate cost
pool and allocated to cost objectives based on some causal
relationship. In this case that would be direct engineering
labor. For FY 1982, the auditor developed estimates for this
rate restructuring as shown in Exhibit 5-1.
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The G&A rate would decline by 14.2 percent as a result of
decreasing the G&A expense pool by $6,655,000 (the amount
-Exhibit 5-1
DCAA AUDITOR DEVELOPED RATE RESTRUCTURING
G&A Rate - Present Condition FY82 Forecast
(A) Total G&A Expenses (including
total engineering costs) $11, 518,000
(B) Total Factory Cost Input Base $50, 618,000
(C) G&A Expense Rate (A/B)
G&A Rate - Audit Determined
22.7%
Total G&A Expenses $11, 518,000
Less: Engineering Costs 6, 655.000
(D) Adjusted G&A Expense Pool $4, 863,000
Total Factory Cost Input Base $50, 618,000
Add: Engineering Costs 6, 655.000
(E) Adjusted Factory Cost Input Base $57, 273,000
(F) G&A Expense Rate (D/E) 8.5%
(G) Rate Difference Questioned (C- F) 14.2%
(H)
Encr Expense Rate - Audit Determined
$1 536,000Direct Engineering Labor Base
(I) Engineering Expense Pool
Engineering Expense Rate (I/H)
$5 119,000
333.27%
of engineering expense included in the pool), and increasing
the cost input base by this same amount. The engineering
expense rate, based on direct engineering labor dollars, was
developed by taking the indirect portion of the engineering
expenses, which would make up the engineering expense pool,
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and dividing it by the direct portion of engineering labor.
The result is a new engineering expense overhead rate of
333.27 percent of direct engineering labor expense. The
auditor concluded from this that the estimated annual cost
impact on DOD contracts could be in excess of $400,000 of
additional costs to DOD, but did not include any explanation
or documentation to support this figure. On 5 April 1982,
the ACO provided a copy of the audit report to AEC and
requested comments be provided on the findings. AEC responded
on 16 April 1982 in complete disagreement with the auditor's
findings. In referring to the audit report, AEC commented:
The report states: "The subcontractor's accounting
practice for engineering costs is to charge all
engineering costs as indirect in the G&A pool." This
statement is incorrect and does not reflect AEC accounting
practices. The AEC Accounting Manual states (Ch.VIII,
P.l): "Research and Development costs identifiable to a
particular product or activity are accounted for under the
project accounting system. Each individual project is
assigned a project number which attaches to a specific
number and order." The manual enumerates specific types
of data which are accumulated for each project, including
direct labor, parts transferred, purchased items,
subcontract work, and tooling. Thus, costs which can be
identified to specific cost objectives are charged direct.
Costs not identifiable are accumulated in the engineering
pool. Clearly, this is consistent with practices required
by CAS 418.
AEC is attempting to equate research and development costs
with engineering costs in order to show that they do have a
written policy for the allocation of engineering costs and
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that it isn't their policy to charge it all to G&A. However,
all R&D costs cannot be classified as engineering and all
engineering costs are not considered R&D. Therefore the
argument was weak and unfounded, but it was the closest thing
to a written policy that AEC had.
AEC's response was forwarded by the ACO to DCAA for
review. On 29 July 1982, DCAA provided to the ACO comments
regarding AEC's position. DCAA maintained that AEC has the
capability to account for direct engineering labor and
engineering overhead costs and therefore is required to
maintain a separate engineering overhead pool and a base of
direct engineering labor which is representative of the
activity being supervised.
The DCAA letter went on to describe four conditions that
existed in AEC's accounting practices which would have an
impact on the CAS 418 non-compliance. Those conditions were:
1. The contractor has not defined when engineering costs
will be charged direct or indirect in accordance with CAS
418 requirements. The contractor records engineering costs
direct to final cost objectives as well as indirectly to G&A
expenses. The contractor has no written policies that
substantiate what their criteria are for charging
engineering costs direct or indirect to a final cost
objective
.
2. The contractor arbitrarily allocates 50 percent of
engineering direct charges to cost of sales when a project
is authorized. The remaining expenses are classified as
unabsorbed project burden and are added to the engineering
overhead expense pool. The unabsorbed account may or may
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not be charged back to those engineering direct project
charges upon contract completion.
3. The contractor maintains an overhead pool identified by
engineering department for those charges of supervision,
indirect labor, profit sharing, member benefit expense,
occupancy and other associated engineering related costs.
4. A material amount of the costs included in the indirect
cost pool are costs of management or supervision of
engineers. Therefore, an allocation base of direct
engineering labor must be used for the engineering activity
being managed (per CAS 418-40. (c )( 1 )) .
As before, the auditor concluded that in order for AEC to
comply with the requirements of CAS 418, they must establish
a properly prepared engineering overhead pool and a direct
engineering labor base. The auditor also recommended to the
ACO that AEC prepare and submit a cost impact proposal for all
CAS covered contracts and subcontracts that would be affected
by this change.
The ACO concurred with the auditor's conclusions, and on
9 August 1982 sent a letter to AEC explaining the Government's
position. In short, the ACO recommended that AEC establish an
engineering overhead pool and a direct engineering labor base
in order to comply with CAS 418, and further requested a cost
impact proposal be submitted as a result of the CAS non-
compliance.
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C. DISPUTING THE CASE
After several months delay, attributed to consultation
with outside accounting assistance, AEC responded on 17
February 1983. The letter began with the following statement
which summed up their position:
We do not believe the recommended changes are in the best
interests of the U.S. Government or AEC. The Government
would have to pay an additional $1.54 million for
contracts which have been negotiated to date, plus an
indeterminable but much larger amount for future
contracts. AEC would have to make changes to accounting
systems which would increase administrative costs for all
customers
.
The cost impact of $1.54 million was arrived at by
developing a new overhead rate structure as recommended by the
DCAA auditor. AEC developed an engineering overhead rate by
combining engineering department labor from direct and
indirect costs, and divided this total into the amount
representing engineering support costs, which were removed
from G&A. This resulted in the following rate changes:
Overhead Current Restructured
Base Rates Rates
Material Overhead Dir Matl 17.1% 17.1%
Labor Overhead Dir Labor 496.1% 593.3%
Engineering Overhead Dir Eng Labor 183.5%G&A Total Cost 23.1% 18.7%
AEC identified eleven contracts which would have been
affected by the change in overhead rates. These were all
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contracts which had been finalized after 20 September 1980
through to present CAS-covered contracts in-house as of
February 1983. The new rates were multiplied by the estimated
cost inputs for the affected contracts, and the percentage
change in total cost was applied to the final negotiated
prices. The result, in each and every case, was a price
increase the sum of which totaled $1,542,698.
It is interesting to note that AEC was not arguing that
they were in compliance with CAS 418, but rather were
attempting to make a case that complying with the exact letter
of CAS 418 in this circumstance would be detrimental to the
Government. The real driving force behind their position
however was not the interests of the Government, but rather
the resources that AEC would have to expend in order to make
the necessary changes to its accounting systems. AEC's
official position as stated in its letter was:
AEC prefers to leave present accounting practices and
procedures unchanged inasmuch as the suggested changes
would entail additional costs for both the company and the
Government, with little advantage to either, excepting
stricter compliance to the letter of CAS 418. We
respectfully suggest that it is to our mutual advantage to
resolve this matter in a manner which will be the least
costly to both parties. Therefore, we suggest the
following course of action:
1. AEC will amend its Accounting Manual to clarify
policies and practices for classifying costs as direct or
indirect; and
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2. AEC will continue to develop and propose rates which
are consistent with present accounting systems.
The subsequent DCAA audit, dated 5 April 1983, of AEC ' s
cost impact proposal focused on two issues. First, was the
methodology used by AEC in developing the restructured rates.
Second, and more importantly was the actual applicability date
of CAS 418 for AEC.
AEC's proposed rates were based on FY 1981 actual cost
data. The DCAA auditor preferred to use FY 1983 budgetary
data (FY 1982 actuals were not available and he wanted the
most current and accurate cost data) adjusted for unallowables
and escalation of labor bases consistent with prior years.
The restructured rates as proposed by AEC and as determined by
the auditor are summarized below:
AEC Proposed Audit Determined
Rates Rates
Material Overhead 17.1% 17.1%
Labor Overhead 593.3% 585.0%
Engineering Overhead 183.5% 162.0%
G & A 18.7% 14.0%
However, the auditor considered any cost impact at this
point to be a moot point because of the applicability date of
CAS 418 for AEC. AEC's proposed cost impact was based on
contracts received after the effective date of CAS 418 which
was 20 September 1980. Their applicability date for CAS 418
was 1 October 1982, which was determined as the second fiscal
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year after receipt of a trigger contract (first CAS covered
contract awarded after effective date of new standard), which
was received on 28 October 1980. The distinction here is
between the effective and applicability dates for a Cost
Accounting Standard. According to DOD Working Group Item 76-
7, the effective date of a standard designates the point in
time when the pricing of all future CAS-covered procurements
must reflect the requirements of the newly promulgated
standard; and identifies those existing contracts eligible for
an equitable adjustment to reflect the cost impact of
applying, prospectively, the provisions of the new standard.
The applicability date marks the beginning of the period when
the contractor must actually change the accounting and
reporting systems to conform to the standard [Ref. 12: p. 89-
90]. AEC's fiscal year ends on 30 September, hence their
applicability date for changing their records would be 1
October 1982.
In his audit report, the DCAA auditor concluded:
Since the contractor has not received a contract after the
applicability date, CAS 418 is not applicable. Therefore,
the proposed cost increase is not applicable and should be
disallowed. Notwithstanding the fact that the contractor
is still in potential non-compliance, rather than actual
non-compliance, nor that cost impact need not be
calculated, we are of the opinion that the contractor
adhere to the provisions of CAS 418 beginning fiscal year
1 October 1983. At "that time, cost impact may be
relatively minor, irregardless , there would be positive
benefits to the Government in the event engineering effort
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in contracts is significant, or if engineering contracts
are received in the future. We further believe that CAS
418 should be adhered to by all contractors who are
subject to it regardless of its significance in impact.
The contractor should be required to submit a cost impact
statement that shows the impact on these contracts when
the standard becomes effective.
On 26 April 1983, the ACO informed AEC by letter of the
Government's position. Specifically, that they must adhere to
the provisions of CAS 418 beginning on 1 October 1983, and at
that time a cost impact statement covering all active
Government contracts in-house be submitted.
However, the DCAA auditor had made a mistake in the audit
report, and submitted an amended audit report on 15 June 1983.
The mistake involved the applicability date, which the auditor
originally determined to be 1 October 1983. Actually, it was
1 October 1982. The auditor corrected his mistake and now
concluded that since AEC had not prepared a cost impact
statement within 60 days of the fiscal year beginning 1
October 1982, no increased costs were allowable on its
Government contracts. This 60 day requirement is contained in
the Cost Accounting Standards Clause and FAR 52.230-4. AEC's
cost impact statement was submitted on 17 February 1983, four
and one-half months after the 1 October 1982 applicability
date
.
On 24 June 1983, the ACO sent AEC another letter
rescinding the 26 April letter, and informing AEC of the
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Government's new position. First, that AEC was now in non-
compliance with the requirements of CAS 418 and any increased
costs paid by the Government can and will be recovered with
interest. Second, that AEC would not be allowed to recover
additional costs on current contracts as a result of
compliance with CAS 418, because they did not file a timely
cost impact statement. Finally, the ACO requested that within
30 days, AEC agree or submit reasons why existing practices
were in compliance.
AEC ' s response, dated 28 July 1983, was short (only one
page), and focused on the negative effect that implementation
of the proposed accounting change would have on contract costs
to the Government. In their response they state:
Developing and proposing a separate engineering rate would
increase the cost of virtually all CAS-covered contracts.
This was the conclusion of the DCAA review of our cost
impact statement. Our intention in preparing the
statement was not to recover additional amounts from the
Government, but to demonstrate the added cost for future
contracts if we were forced to comply. AEC prefers to
leave present accounting practices and procedures
unchanged, inasmuch as the suggested changes would:
1. Entail additional costs for both the company and the
Government, with little advantage to either; and
2. Force us to treat the Government differently than
our commercial customers who account for about three-
quarters of total billings.
In order to support -their claim that these additional
costs were reason enough to leave present accounting practices
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unchanged, AEC cited a paragraph from the Federal Procurement
Regulations relating to changes in cost accounting practices,
which states:
Prior to the use of the equitable adjustment provisions of
the Cost Accounting Standards clause, the cognizant
contracting officer (ACO) shall make a finding that the
change is desirable and is not detrimental to the
interests of the Government.
Their argument is not based on the issue of compliance,
but rather they are appealing to the ACO to use what they
perceive as the ACO ' s prerogative to make a determination that
forcing this change would be detrimental to the interests of
the Government. This in turn would lead the ACO to allow AEC
to maintain their current accounting practices.
This would be the last official correspondence between the
ACO and AEC relating to this issue for three years and eight
months. There is no indication in the official records why
the ACO at the time did not continue to follow-up on the non-
compliance. Since the ACO position changed hands twice
between July 1983 and March 1988, and once again in August
1989 (when the current ACO took over), it was impossible to
determine the exact reasons for the inaction.
Strictly from a speculative standpoint, there are
indications that the ACO didn't want to make a decision on
this issue. In January 1984, the ACO received a letter from
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the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) of one of the largest
Government programs that AEC was involved in. The letter
expressed concerns that correcting AEC ' s accounting practice
may increase contract costs by several million dollars. This
cost increase would heavily impact budget and funding
considerations for the program.
On the other hand, DCAA had determined that AEC was in
non-compliance with CAS 418 and should change their accounting
practice. The ACO may have found himself in a no win
situation. Thus, no action was the best action. If he had
officially determined that the change in accounting practice
was not necessary, then he had to be prepared to justify his
decision in view of the DCAA audit report. On the other hand,
if he mandated AEC change its accounting practice, he may have
been asked to justify his decision in view of the increased
costs and possible disruption of ongoing programs.
D. RESOLUTION
On 3 March 1988, the Government officially resurrected the
CAS 418 non-compliance case. At this time AEC had several CAS
issues pending, including an updated disclosure statement and
non-compliance cases on CAS 401, 402, 405 and 418. In an
attempt to resolve all these CAS issues, the ACO sent a letter
to AEC requesting an updated disclosure statement and cost
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impact statements for the various CAS non-compliances. AEC
responded by letter requesting an extension on the CAS 418
case until 10 June 1988, which was granted.
AEC's response, which was not submitted until 22 August
1988, was almost identical to the cost impact statement that
had been submitted on 17 February 1983. The only difference
was that they used actual FY 1987 data to restructure the
overhead rates. However, the results and the conclusions were
the same. The restructured rates resulted in a net price
increase to the Government in the amount of $1,555,064. This
included all open contracts currently being shipped against
and open orders not yet negotiated.
AEC's conclusion, as before, was that the cost increase
was certainly detrimental to the interests of the Government
and so compliance with CAS 418 should not be mandated. They
requested however, that if the ACO determined that the change
in accounting practice be made, they be granted a grace period
of three years in order to implement the necessary accounting
systems changes that would be required.
The DCAA audit that followed, dated 30 January 1989, was
in agreement that the Government had not paid any increased
costs as a result of the CAS 418 non-compliance. Further, the
auditor agreed that compliance would have resulted in higher
contract costs to the Government, although to a less
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significant degree than AEC had determined. The audit report
did not include the calculations to support this conclusion.
Nevertheless, the two sides agreed that compliance with CAS
418 would more than likely result in the Government paying
more on future contracts.
The real issue for DCAA was not the increased costs, but
rather the inadequacy of AEC ' s present accounting practices.
In the audit report the auditor brings up the following points
which highlight the need for compliance with CAS 418:
1. The contractor has not defined when costs will be charged
direct or indirect in accordance with the requirement of CAS
418.40(a), which states that , "A business unit shall have
a written statement of accounting policies and practices for
classifying costs as direct or indirect which shall be
consistently applied." The contractor has not defined when,
for example, engineering costs will be charged direct or
indirect. The contractor records engineering costs direct
to final cost objectives as well as indirectly to General
and Administrative expenses. The contractor has no written
policies that substantiate what the criteria is for charging
engineering costs direct or indirect. We noted that the
contractor is on record as stating in a 17 February 1983
letter to the cognizant ACO that: "AEC will amend its
Accounting Manual to clarify policies and procedures for
classifying costs as direct or indirect." To date, the
contractor has not performed this step and has previously
stated that their Accounting Manual is out of date.
2. A material amount of the cost included in the indirect
cost G&A pool are costs of management or supervision of
engineers. Additional costs identified by engineering
department include: indirect labor, profit sharing, member
benefit expense, occupancy, and other associated related
costs. CAS 418.40(c) (1, 2, and 3) provides that, "pooled
costs shall be allocated in reasonable proportion to cost
objectives based on the beneficial or causal relationship of
the pooled costs to cost objectives." Therefore, we are of
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the opinion that AEC has contravened these provisions of CAS
418 by including engineering on proposals through the
application of a combined Engineering/General and
Administrative expense rate.
3. The contractor has requested a grace period of three
years in order to implement the changes necessary for
compliance with CAS 418. It is the contractor's position
that the accounting changes required for compliance with CAS
418 are detrimental to the interests of the Government.
Thus, the contractor asserts that the additional time
requested to implement the accounting changes will not
result in any increase in costs paid by the Government.
However, the contractor has not provided details of
management's action plan demonstrating the how, what, when
and so forth as to the implementation of the necessary
changes. Nor has the contractor specified how the progress
should be monitored on a continual basis to ensure that the
non-compliant condition does not reverse itself and result
in increased costs paid by the Government.
The ACO concurred with the conclusions contained in the
audit report. On 14 April 1989, the ACO sent a letter to AEC
requesting three things. First, the disclosure statement be
revised to include criteria for charging engineering direct or
indirect. Second, a detailed description of the necessary
changes required for accounting practices to be compliant.
Third, how and when these changes would be effected and
monitored for compliance. In conclusion, the ACO stated:
It is determined your compliance with CAS 418 will not be
detrimental to the Government and that the changes
required will not significantly increase contract prices
to the Government. Additionally, FAR 30.306, in support
of FAR 52.230-3 and 5, states the U.S. will not pay
increased costs by reason of a contractor's failure to use
applicable cost accounting standards.
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AEC submitted two responses to this request by the ACO.
The first response, dated 2 June 1989, was brief and attempted
to explain in general terms what the changes in accounting
practices would enable the company to do. Specifically, the
letter stated:
This project will enable AEC to record costs, by type, so
that engineering rates can be determined. This will also
allow us to separate engineering expenses from G&A costs.
However, the changes needed are extensive and have not
been all specified at this time. In early June, necessary
program changes will be determined and we will be able to
provide a preliminary schedule for implementation and a
detailed description of the changes required.
The second response, dated 23 June 1989, was more specific
as to the changes being made and the difficulties in achieving
these changes in a short period of time. In this response AEC
highlighted the following points about what they termed as
their new project cost system:
1. The ability to improve project management capabilities.
2. To allow costs for any type of project to be accumulated.
The current system has a limited definition of project
costs. However, under the proposed system, we will
distinguish between different types of projects such as:
independent development, contract development, basic
research, product support, retrofit business, B&P, capital
projects, technical billings, and any other type of activity
that requires a cost accumulation system.
3. The ability to accumulate costs of activities while still
recording the proper general ledger transactions. Project
cost information will identify the general ledger account
charged allowing the project costs to be accumulated by
account number, which will facilitate compliance. The
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programming effort for this basic requirement will be the
most difficult and time consuming to implement.
4. The ability to post costs automatically from the
different input systems. Currently, none of the costs post
automatically and are not posted until after the end of the
month. This delays information feedback to users.
5. Project reports that better fit the needs of the user.
AEC admitted in their letter that they were at the
beginning of the planning process to achieve these changes.
Further, they stated that it would take six months to gather
the necessary information and lay out a timetable for
completion of the project.
On 3 July 1989, the ACO responded by letter in agreement
that the proposed changes would have an effect on the CAS 418
non-compliance, and requested a more definite timetable for
implementation. AEC provided an interim reply on 3 November
1989, which didn't provide additional information. Finally,
on 28 February 1990 they provided more definitive plans.
AEC informed the ACO that they had completed two important
actions towards completion of the project. Specifically, the
program specifications had been identified and the project had
been assigned to a programmer. Additionally, they stated that
four steps were remaining to completion. Those steps were:
1. Program requests needed to be developed.
2. Program requests needed to be approved by those affected.
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3. Actual programming.
4. Implementation of the program.
AEC had set an initial implementation date of 1 October 1990.
The ACO concurred with the implementation date, and
requested that AEC provide updated status as the project
progressed. Due to programming problems the implementation
date slipped twice. However, on 1 January 1991, the new cost
system was fully implemented. Nine years after DCAA had found
AEC to be in non-compliance with CAS 418, the company
implemented the changes necessary to comply with the standard.
E . SUMMARY
This case brings to light two important issues with regard
to the Cost Accounting Standards. The first issue concerns
the implementation of a new Cost Accounting Standard, and the
second issue deals with whether the Government is justified in
implementing a standard if the end result will mean increased
prices for the Government.
This case is a classic example of the problems inherent in
the implementation of a new Cost Accounting Standard. It took
over nine years to get AEC to comply with the requirements of
CAS 418, and the case is still not officially closed because
the ACO is currently waiting for AEC to submit a cost impact
statement as a result of the change in accounting practice.
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This delay in resolution was not caused by a disputed
interpretation of CAS 418, but rather, was the result of
confusion and indecision on the part of Government personnel
trying to implement a new Cost Accounting Standard.
In the initial audit report submitted by DCAA, the auditor
determined that AEC ' s applicability date for CAS 418 was 1
January 1982. This meant that by the time the ACO received
the report, AEC was past the applicability date and was then
considered to be in non-compliance with CAS 418. If the
auditor had correctly determined the applicability date as 1
October 1982, AEC could possibly have made the necessary
adjustments to their accounting system prior to the deadline.
However, believing that they were already in a non-compliant
situation, AEC opted to try and refute the allegations. The
actual applicability date wasn't correctly determined until
two and one-half years after the initial finding.
There was also confusion on the method and timing for
determining the cost impact. In the initial audit report, the
auditor used FY 1982 data in order to restructure the overhead
rates. However, since the applicability date wasn't until FY
1983, those calculations were misleading and meaningless. It
is also interesting to note that the auditor alleged over-
pricing in excess of $400,000 on DOD contracts as a result of
the non-compliance. This was the only time that this
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conclusion was ever reached by either a DCAA auditor or AEC.
The auditor provided no data to substantiate this finding, and
so it can only be assumed that this was the conclusion of an
over zealous auditor determined to find questioned costs.
When AEC submitted its first cost impact statement, there
was no real guidance given by the ACO as to the method and
timing that should be used. AEC assumed that the cost impact
should be determined prospectively from the date the standard
became effective, on 20 September 1980. They also did not
realize that the cost impact statement needed to be submitted
within 60 days after the applicability date. At the time
though, they weren't interested in actually collecting
additional costs on contracts in order to comply with CAS 418.
Their main interest was to convince the ACO that the cost
impact of compliance was detrimental to the Government, in the
hope that the ACO would not mandate the change in accounting
practice
.
If AEC had been advised from the beginning that their
applicability date was 1 October 1982, and that they had 60
days from that date to submit a cost impact statement,
prospectively from that date, resolution could have been
quicker and easier. However, it wasn't until mid 1983 that
the actual applicability date was determined, and a proper
cost impact statement is yet to be submitted.
120
The implementation of a new Cost Accounting Standard
definitely presents unique difficulties for which the ACO and
the company were unprepared. The effective and applicable
dates must be determined and distinguished from the outset.
The cost impact of any required change in accounting practice
must be determined from the appropriate date and calculated
prospectively. Also, the ACO must be prepared to analyze the
change in accounting practice to determine if it goes beyond
the scope of that required to comply with the standard. This
must be accomplished in a timely manner in order to determine
the appropriate equitable adjustment to be made.
Consideration also must be given to the possible funding
impact on current contracts and thus to ongoing programs. All
of this must be carefully analyzed and coordinated in order to
bring an expeditious conclusion to a CAS non-compliance
resulting from a new standard.
The second issue that this case raises is whether or not
a standard should be implemented if it increases costs to the
Government. In this case, DCAA and eventually the ACO agreed
that it was essential for the Government to implement CAS 418.
The fact that the change in accounting practice will
adversely affect contract pricing for the Government makes the
situation difficult. A conflict of interest arises between
DCAA, the company, and the Contract Administration Office's
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customer activities. DCAA wants to follow the letter of the
law, the company doesn't want to expend resources to make
changes in its accounting practices, and customer activities
advocate maintaining the status quo so as not to upset their
ongoing programs.
In this case the argument posed by AEC that increased
costs are detrimental to the Government is unfounded. While
it is true that the Government may end up paying more because
of the change, this is because the change in accounting
practice will provide more accurate allocation of costs to
cost objectives. Direct and indirect engineering costs will
be more accurately allocated to all contracts, and those that
use the engineering services will pay their fair share. Thus,
there really aren't any additional costs, but rather a
redistribution of the costs more equitably between contracts.
From an auditing standpoint, the accounting practice being
employed by AEC with regard to engineering costs was open to
a great deal of inconsistency. They had no real definite
policy for allocating engineering costs direct or indirect,
and misallocated much of these costs to G&A. With the
implementation of CAS 418, the allocation of these costs as
direct or indirect becomes written policy, direct engineering
costs will be allocated to the proper cost objective, and
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indirect costs will be accumulated and allocated based on a
more causal relationship.
The primary goal of the Cost Accounting Standards Board
was to bring uniformity and consistency to the cost accounting
practices followed by industry. It was recognized that at
times this may result in increased costs on certain Government
contracts, however, on the whole the benefits of change would
outweigh the costs. The difficulty lies in convincing
industry to expend the resources to make the necessary
changes, and educating Government personnel on the accounting
issues involved.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the researcher's
conclusions and recommendations from this research project.
Each of the three CAS cases examined contained significant
differences between the Government and the company in the
interpretation and implementation of the Cost Accounting
Standards involved. While the facts are unique to these
cases, the reasons for these differences and the solutions to
them can be applied throughout the defense industry. After
evaluating these three cases, the researcher has developed the
following conclusions and recommendations.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion #1. The Administrative Contracting Officer
(ACO) does not have a full understanding of the issues
involved in interpreting and implementing the Cost Accounting
Standards. The ACO is the key person in the Contract
Administration Organization for ensuring that CAS issues are
pursued and resolved fairly and expeditiously. The most
recent ACO involved in the cases presented in this research
project had no formal CAS training, and no previous experience
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dealing with accounting issues. This is probably common
throughout the ACO community.
The ACO must make the determination of non-compliance,
enforce the implementation of the Standards and negotiate an
equitable cost impact. However, as can be seen from the three
case studies presented in this research, the ACO is hesitant
to make decisions on CAS issues and relies completely on DCAA
input. The ACO must have the ability to analyze and interpret
both contractor and DCAA positions in order to make informed
decisions and develop a realistic negotiation position. As it
stands, the ACO always takes the DCAA position (right or
wrong), which causes additional friction between the
contractor and the Government, causes inordinate delays in
resolution of the issues and increases the costs of
implementation for both Government and Industry.
Conclusion #2. Companies such as American Electronics
Corporation will continue to have problems adhering to the
Cost Accounting Standards. A company that has a significant
interest in both commercial and Government applications of its
products has tremendous difficulty maintaining two separate
and distinct types of accounting systems. The Cost Accounting
Standards impose rigid requirements for the estimating,
accumulating, reporting, and allocating of costs that
generally are not followed in the commercial environment.
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Smaller companies are not staffed or trained to handle
these additional requirements, and won't know of their
existence until that first instance of non-compliance. AEC
was not prepared to handle all the problems associated with
the implementation of the Cost Accounting Standards, and had
no one internally available that was sufficiently
knowledgeable to assist them. The company was eventually
forced to hire three individuals to handle only Government
accounting issues, and these individuals admitted that their
knowledge came largely from on-the-job experiences over the
years. This coupled with the need for outside accounting
assistance results in a significant cost impact to the company
to adhere to the Standards. AEC is representative of a large
group of defense contractors and subcontractors that will
prefer to maintain commercial accounting practices, even at
the expense of diminishing Government business. While these
companies represent a small percentage of total Government
contracted dollars, they do represent a large percentage of
Government contractors and subcontractors.
Conclusion #3. The Government, especially DCAA, is more
concerned about cost impact and recovery than ensuring the
expeditious compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards.
The first case presented, involving CAS 401 and 402, is a
perfect example of this. In this case the claimed costs were
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disallowed because AEC used judgement instead of more detailed
and substantiated accounting methods. However, it was shown
by AEC and confirmed by DCAA that if AEC had complied with CAS
401 and 402 as directed by DCAA, costs actually would have
been higher for the Government. Nevertheless, the cost impact
issue was pursued vigorously with little concern for actual
compliance. The Government policy of figuring out cost impact
based on what would have been negotiated if the non-compliant
practice is eliminated but not corrected leaves the contractor
with little ground to stand on.
Compliance should be the overriding issue in all cases.
This is not to say that cost impact is unimportant, but to
gain the support and cooperation of the contractor, especially
in a circumstance where the cost is valid and fraud is not
present, the Government should concentrate its efforts on the
expeditious resolution of the non-compliant practice.
Conclusion #4. The rules regarding the implementation of
a new Cost Accounting Standard are too complex. Under the
current procedures, the ACO must deal with multiple issues
relating to the implementation of a new standard and its
effect on a firm. The ACO must be able to distinguish between
the effective and applicability dates of the standard for the
contractor and ensure the contractor understands the
significance of these dates. Further, the ACO in conjunction
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with DCAA must be able to determine the effects of the new
standard on the CAS-contract universe and whether the
contractor's proposal to comply includes only the mandatory
changes
.
The issues of the CAS-contract universe and the cost
impact are especially difficult because of the fact that the
new standard will impact retroactively on only the new
performance of old contracts. This means that only that
portion of an old contract not yet performed as of the
effective date of the standard will be included. This is
obviously a difficult concept to comprehend and apply. The
reason for this procedure was to preclude the contractor from
having to maintain different accounting systems for different
contracts. However, as can be seen in the third case
presented in this study, the ACO is unprepared and under
staffed to deal with all these issues and be able to
accurately assess the contractor's position. DCAA is there to
assist in these efforts, however, the ACO cannot and should
not rely 100 percent on DCAA input. As evidenced from the
case, this input can be erroneous. With the recent
reformation of the CASB and imminent promulgation of new
standards, this issue will become increasingly important.
Conclusion #5. Determining the cost impact of a CAS non-
compliance is the single most difficult and time consuming
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element in resolving a CAS conflict. In the three cases
presented in this research, interpretation of the Cost
Accounting Standards involved was not the major problem.
Within a reasonable period of time the auditor and the
contractor were able to come to agreement as to the non-
compliant practice.
In cases where interpretation is the overriding issue, the
contractor will generally dispute the ACO ' s determination and
appeal the case to some other authority (BCA, Court, GAO) .
This was seen in the cases reviewed in Chapter II. Even in
these circumstances the ACO may still be left to settle the
cost impact issue. Determining the true exact cost impact is
perhaps an impossible task. Differing interpretations over
the contract universe to include, time periods involved, and
accounting methods to employ, make it extremely difficult for
the two sides to come to an agreement. Above all else, the
ultimate goal of each is in complete contrast. The contractor
seeks to absolutely minimize the cost impact and may
conveniently leave out affected contracts. DCAA in reaction
to this looks to maximize cost impact and often paints a worst
case scenario. The differing positions, as evidenced in the
three cases, can at times be incredulous. Often too far apart
to even begin discussing a settlement.
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Conclusion #6. The current process of resolving non-
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards fosters an
adversarial relationship between Government and Industry.
From the beginning to the end of the process each side has an
"us against them" attitude, where one side will win and one
will lose. This is evidenced in all three cases presented in
this research. In each, the contractor's cost impact
proposals and Government audits were completed in isolation of
the other side and without each party completely understanding
exactly what is going on. This puts both the contractor and
the DCAA auditor on the defensive, both trying to convince the
ACO that their widely conflicting positions are correct.
However, the ACO doesn't have the time or a complete
understanding of the accounting issues involved to determine
an equitable compromise. It takes months to prepare a well
documented cost impact proposal and an equally long period of
time to conduct a thorough audit of the proposal. The current
process only generates years of proposals and audits, mounds
of paperwork for the ACO to wade through and ill feelings on
both sides. The eventual resolution is more a result of




C . RECOMMENDAT I ONS
Recommendation #1. The ACO should be given adequate
training in the area of cost accounting and the Cost
Accounting Standards. Before the ACO can begin to understand
CAS issues, he/she must acquire a general understanding of
cost accounting principles and the types of cost accounting
systems used in industry. Basic cost accounting courses are
taught in just about every college and university in this
country, and should be a prerequisite for becoming an ACO.
Once this basic knowledge of cost accounting is acquired, then
the ACO must be given more indepth training on the Cost
Accounting Standards. Training could be given on an informal
basis by local DCAA auditors, or in a more formal classroom
setting away from the work place. The training should
concentrate on ensuring that the ACO develops a general
understanding of all the standards, their applicability in
different situations and the requirements for implementation.
This can be accomplished mainly through the use of cases such
as those presented in this research. The ACO is the key
Government official responsible for the implementation of the
Cost Accounting Standards, and without a good working
knowledge of cost accounting and CAS, will not be able to
properly carry out his/her duties.
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Recommendation #2. Raise the thresholds for mandatory
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards. The current
thresholds of $100,000 for a single contract or ten million
dollars of total defense contracts in the preceding cost
accounting period, were established over 20 years ago and are
no longer realistic. Companies such as AEC that do
predominantly commercial type business are now being required
to comply with CAS. If the thresholds had been adjusted over
the years to coincide more with the rate of inflation, many of
these companies would be exempt from CAS coverage. It is
these types of companies that are abandoning Government
business because of the extreme administrative burdens placed
on them by Government regulations such as the Cost Accounting
Standards. The dollars that are saved or recouped from these
companies because of adherence to the standards may not be
worth the administrative effort that the Government and the
contractor must go through to monitor and enforce them. This
was evidenced by the cases examined here. In the future the
Government will have less people to monitor requirements such
as CAS, and must select those contractors where CAS can have
the most benefit considering cost and reduced resources.
Recommendation #3. The implementation of a new Cost
Accounting Standard should be on a prospective basis
applicable to new contracts only. This will eliminate the
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confusing and dif ficult-to-implement procedures that currently
exist. Also, if applied properly, cost impact analysis will
be unnecessary because all new contracts would be negotiated
based on the new standard. The only drawback to this
recommendation is that the contractor would have to maintain
two accounting systems until the old contracts were completed.
However, on the whole this would make the process of
implementing a new standard much easier for the ACO and
contractor to understand and execute, and eliminate costly and
time consuming cost impact proposals and audits.
Recommendation #4. Change the focus of cost impact
analysis from the current practice of looking only at what
would have been negotiated throwing out the non-compliant
practice and all of its associated costs, to an analysis which
looks at two things:
1. Is there any evidence of fraud or gross misconduct
that could be construed as fraud?
2. Are the costs incurred valid recoverable costs that
were accounted for in a manner inconsistent with CAS?
If fraud is present then there is no question that the
Government should prosecute and place full emphasis on cost
recovery. However, in most cases the contractor is employing
an accounting practice which is consistent with Generally
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Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and perfectly acceptable
for commercial business.
If the DCAA auditor determines that the costs involved are
valid but accounted for improperly then the actual cost impact
to the Government will in all probability not be of a material
concern. This will then allow the focus to be more on
correcting the non-compliant practice rather than on cost
impact and recovery. The Government must recognize that there
are many gray areas in determining the exact impact of a CAS
non-compliance. The quicker the accounting practice can be
changed to conform to CAS the less impact it will have on
future contracts and lessen the administrative burden of a
prolonged dispute over the cost impact.
Recommendation #5. Encourage more communication and
cooperation between DCAA and the contractor in order to more
amicably settle CAS issues. DCAA and the contractor should
work as a team to address the problem, develop solutions, and
agree to an equitable method for determining any cost impact.
The DCAA auditor should sit down with the contractor to
develop a joint plan to resolve the non-compliant practice and
provide an equitable cost impact analysis agreeable to both
sides. This would eliminate trying to resolve these issues
through the impersonal use of numerous letters, memos and
audits as is the current practice. It would open up the lines
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of communication and give each side a better understanding of
the other's viewpoint. There is no doubt that by approaching
the process in this manner that issues could be resolved much
quicker and with a reduced administrative burden. It may also
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